SITARAM Vs. SIDHANATH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) 1. The suit was tor possession of a house site in the abadl of Patti No. 3 of Mouza Rustampur. It was argued before me on behalf of the plaintiff that neither the village nor the abadi had ever been divided. But there is a clear admission of both these facts by the plaintiff in his oral statement 13th September 1930. I cannot allow him to go behind his pleading. The plaintiff is an occupancy tenant of Patti No. 1. The defendant is the Malguzar of Patti No. 3. On 13th June 1894 the plaintiff obtained possession of a house site in the abadi by a transfer from another tenant who was then in occupation of it. At that time the village had not been partitioned and the plaintiff being a tenant of the village was entitled to a house site. When, however, the village was partitioned into pattis and the plaintiff ceased to be a tenant of Patti No. 3 he lost his right to a house site in the abadi of that patti and became a bare licensee. This position has been challenged before me. It is urged that Under Section 203 Land Revenue Act of 1917, any tenant of the mahal is entitled to a house site in its abadi irrespective of a division into pattis. In the abstract this is a proposition which cannot be questioned. There can be no doubt that the plaintiff is entitled to a house site in the abadi of this mahal, but the question is in which patti. Section 203 does not assist us there. It was settled as long ago as Chandrabhan v. Deo Rao (1899) 12 CPLR 66 that when a mahal is divided into pattis each proprietor becomes the landlord of his particular patti. Under Section 203 the tenant is entitled to claim a place of residence from his own landlord and not from any other person. It is clear then that he can only look to the landlord of his own patti and has no right to a house site beyond it. The question was decided in Dayaram v. Dashrath AIR 1928 Nag 86.

(2.) THERE is therefore no doubt that the defendant remained a bare licensee after the partition. The lower appellate Court has held that since the plaintiff never abadoned his license he cannot be ejected from the holding. This ignores the provisions of Section 60 Easements Act, under which a license is revocable at the will of the grantor unless it happens to fall within the two exceptions specified there. It is urged that it does. I am clear it cannot for two reasons. The first is that the plaintiff has not built upon the land in pursuance of his license, and the second is that the section is subject to an agreement to the contrary. In the present case the license was granted in accordance with village custom now embodied in Section 203, Land Revenue Act, to enable an agriculturist of that village to have a right of residence in it. Once that right disappeared the purpose of the license came to an end and so the license itself became revocable. There can be no question that the license was revoked in this case for the Malguzar stepped into the site and took possession of it. It was at that time lying vacant and no further act was necessary on the landlord's part to indicate his intention to revoke the license. The appeal is allowed and the plaintiff's claim is dismissed. The plaintiff-respondent will bear the costs of the defendant-appellant throughout.