Madhavan Nair, J - (1.)Defendants 1 and 2 are the appellants. The appeal arises out of a suit instituted by the plaintiff for a declaration that the allegd adoption of defendant 1 by defendant 2 is not true or valid. One Popoori Ramakrishnayya died in or about 1900. The plaintiff is his daughter by his first wife. After the death of the plaintiff's mother, Ramakrishnayya married defendant 2. At his death she had not attained puberty. Defendants 3 and 4 are the divided brothers of the deceased Ramakrishnayya and his nearest gnatis. Defendant 1 is the son of defendant 4. On 10 July 1923 defendant 2 sent a registered post card Ex. 3 to defendant 3 requesting him to give her written authority to adopt. This letter was refused by him. On 26 August 1923 she sent another registered post card Ex. 4 to defendant 3 making the same request. This was also refused. On 20 September 1923 the registered post card Ex. 5 was sent by her pleader making the same request. This was also refused by defendant 3. On the same date as Ex. 3 defendant 2 sent Ex. 7 to defendant 4 asking his permission to adopt. On 25th November 1923 he gave the required consent for the adoption by executing Ex. 2, the deed of authority. On 17 April 1924 defendant 2 adopted defendant 1 and executed in his favour the adoption deed Ex. 1. Thi3 was attested, amongst others, by Popoori Sastrulu and Popoori Gangathara Sastri, two reversioners of the deceased Ramakrishnayya. The evidence discloses that two other reversioners of Ramakrishnayya, Popoori Sambayya and Popoori Ramtharakam, were also in existence at that time. The plaintiff denied the factum of the adoption and contended that even if true it was invalid. Holding that the adoption was proved, the learned Judge held that it was invalid for two reasons : (1) that the plaintiff who was the nearest reversioner was not consulted, and (2) that even if plaintiff's consent was not necessary, when defendant 3 had not given his consent the adoption should not have been made on the sole consent of defendant 4 without convening a meeting of the other kinsmen and taking their consent. Ground 2 is more elaborately stated in para. 27 of the judgment as follows: The second reason for holding that defendant 1's adoption is invalid is that, even assuming that plaintiff was not one of those to be consulted, defendant 2 should have convened a gathering of kinsmen when she found that of the two neatest agnates one of them only was prepared to give his consent. As remarked in Brahmayya V/s. Rattayya a majority of the kinsmen must consent and one of two cannot form a majority. If defendant 3 capriciously withheld his consent, defendant 2 should have taken the consent of the next reversioners who are said to be one Popoori Sambayya and one Popoori Ramatharakam.
(2.)In appeal Mr. Varadachari argues: (1) that in law the consent of the plaintiff is not necessary for the widow to make a valid adoption, and (2) that the evidence shows that before making the adoption she obtained the consent of a majority of the kinsmen or such consent of the kinsmen as is sufficient to show that her act of adoption was done in the proper and bona fide performance of a religious duty and neither capriciously nor from a corrupt motive, see Collector of Madura V/s. Mootoo Ramalinga Sethupathy (1867-69) 12 M.I.A. which he contends is all that is required in law to make the adoption valid in the absence of the husband's authority. In addition to the grounds found in his favour by the lower Court, Mr. Somasundaram on behalf of respondent 1 urged before us that the authority given to the widow by defendant 4 is too general to be valid and that the evidence shows that the consent was procured by corrupt motives. The latter ground though taken was not pressed as the evidence in support of it was stated to be weak, and therefore need not be dealt with. The ground that the authority is too general is also unsubstantial. In Suryanarayana V/s. Venkaiaramana (1903) 26 Mad 681, the decision referred to in support of this contention, the assent of the sapinda obtained by the widow was for the adoption of "any boy at any time" and this was not acted upon for 19 years. The assent given by defendant 4 by Ex. 2 is not to adopt any boy whom the widow may like but any boy whom you may like either from among agnates or from sagotrajas (the italics are ours) for performance of religious rites as ordained by Sastras
(3.)The class from which the adoption is (to be made is clearly indicated and is (not left as vague and as indefinite as in the case of Suryanarayana v. Venkataraniana (1903) 26 Mad 681. It cannot also be said that after obtaining the consent there was (any delay in making the adoption. No doubt the adoption was about 24 years after the death of the husband, but it imusfc be remembered that at the time of his death defendant 2 was only about 11 years old. If the adoption is otherwise valid it cannot be said that it must be held to be invalid solely on the ground that it was not made by her at a date [earlier than 1924. The only substantial grounds for consideration therefore are the grounds urged in the lower Court and we will deal with them in order. The first question is whether the adoption is invalid for the reason that the plaintiff's consent was not obtained. It is conceded that if the promotion of the spiritual interests of a deceased husband is to be the main factor in determining the validity of an adoption, then the argument that the deceased husband's daughter should be consulted has obviously not much force; but what is contended is that the protection of his estate for his heirs should also be considered by the widow in making the adoption and, if so, the adoption without consulting the daughter, should be held to be invalid. Admittedly there is no authority either of Hindu law texts or of any decision in support of this proposition; what authority there is, is against it, In Visvasundara Row V/s. Somasundara Rao (i) the question arose whether a daughter's son is entitled to be consulted regarding an adoption by a widow and it was held that as he is not agnate he has no right to be consulted.