MUTHIAH CHETTI AND THREE ORS Vs. SUPPAN SERVAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The only question that has been argued before us in this appeal is whether the registration of the document referred to in the plaint is invalid, because of its not having been duly presented for registration "within thirty days after the passing" of such a decree as is mentioned in Section 77 of the Registration Act. If that provision means that the document must be presented within thirty days of the judgment being pronounced, then the presentation of the document is invalid and, on the authority of Raya Raghoba Kamat v. Annapurana Bai (1873) 10 B.H.C.R., 98, the alleged registration is also invalid and of no effect. But the lower courts hold that in this connection the words "passing a decree" must be taken to mean something different from pronouncing judgment. The learned District Munsif refers in his judgment to the Civil Procedure Code, order XX, Rule 7, which provides that the decree shall bear the data on which the judgment is pronounced, but on a consideration of Section 33 of the Code together with the fact that the decree could be prepared only after the time fixed by the Rules of Practice for filing the memorandum of costs has expired, and with the fact that Section 77 of the Registration Act refers to the passing of the decree and not to the date that the decree bears nor to the date when the judgment is pronounced, ha came to the conclusion that passing the decree is something different from pronouncing judgment and something that must of necessity follow the judgment in point of time. He also referred to the Limitation Act, Article 182, under which time runs from the date of the decree, and not from the passing of the decree. He therefore held that the registration was valid, and dismissed the plaintiff s suit, which was for a declaration that the registration was invalid, for setting aside the sale-deed and for possession of the lands referred to in the plaint.

(2.) The learned District Judge was of the same opinion, and added as a further reason that "until the decree has taken form so as to be capable of communication to the official of the Registration Department who is to give effect to it, time could not be held to run against the decree-holder, provided he himself has not been guilty of want of diligence." In connection with this argument we were referred to Abdul Ali v. Mirga Khan (1904) I.L.R., 28 Bom., 8, where it is stated that an order does not become an order unless and until steps are taken by the officer passing it to bring it to the consciousness and knowledge of the party against whom it is passed. Without implying that the ruling in that case governs the facts now before us, it may be said that in circumstances such as those with which we are dealing, in one sense the party against whom the order is passed, is the Registrar.

(3.) As against the train of reasoning above referred to, it was argued before us that the decree bears its date under order XX, Rule 7, and it being a matter of record, it is not permissible to the Court to disregard the terms of the decree, and to say that it was passed on some date other than that which it bears.