MUNNI REDDI Vs. KVENKATA RAW

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a case of misconduct against a first grade pleader practising in Bellary. One Muni Reddi lodged a complaint against the pleader charging him with the misconduct for which he has been tried by the District Judge of Bellary. He subsequently withdrew his complaint, but as the District Judge had before the withdrawal already framed a charge against a pleader, he proceeded with the inquiry, found him guilty of the misconduct charged, and made a report to this Court under Section 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act.

(2.) The facts that led up to the charge are briefly as follows: An inquiry into a charge of dacoity was going on about June 1908 in the Sub-Magistrate s Court of Tadpatri against Muni Reddi. The pleader was engaged according to Muni Reddi s case to defend Him both in the Magistrate s Court and in the Sessions Court of Bellary in the event of the case being committed to the Sessions Court for trial; and a fee of Rs. 350 was settled and paid for the pleader s services in both Courts. The pleader appeared in the Magistrate s Court but did not defend Muni Reddi in the Sessions Court. Ho left the district for Rangoon without making any arrangement for Muni Reddi s defence at the Sessions trial. Another pleader had to be engaged for the defence. Muni Reddi was acquitted at the trial. He subsequently instituted a suit for the recovery of the fees paid by him with interest. It was transferred to the Subordinate Judge s Court of Bellary for trial. The pleader defended the suit contending that his engagement with Muni Reddi was only to defend him in the Magistrate s Court and to put in a petition for bail in the Sessions Court, and did not include Muni Reddi s defence at the Sessions trial, that only Rs. 268 and not the whole of the Rs, 350 stipulated for was paid to him by Muni Reddi, that although Muni Reddi afterwards asserted that he had undertaken the defence in the Sessions Court also, he repudiated any such agreement, and that he had not failed to fulfil the engagement actually entered into by him. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit upholding the pleader s defence. On appeal the District Judge Mr. Phillips reversed the judgment of the Subordinate Judge and found the defendant s contentions to be untrue. He passed an order under Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure directing the prosecution of the pleader for making a false statement on a comparatively unimportant point. The order was set aside by this Court in revision and it is unnecessary to refer to it further. Muni Reddi afterwards put in a petition against the pleader under the Legal Practitioners Act requesting that an inquiry should be made into the pleader s conduct, but as already stated, he subsequently withdrew the petition. The charge framed against the pleader was that having agreed to appear for Muni Reddi in the Sessions Court and received the fee for such appearance he failed to appear, and when asked to return the fee he failed to do so, and that in defending the suit filed by Muni Reddi he denied receipt of part of the fees, and also denied that he was engaged to work in the Sessions Court; and that therefore he was guilty of fraudulent and improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty, an offence under Section 13(b) of the Legal Practitioners Act. No fresh evidence was recorded in support of the charge and indeed there was no one to let in evidence as Muni Reddi had withdrawn his complaint. The pleader evidently relied on the evidence he had already adduced in the civil suit but he also adduced some fresh evidence. He examined two witnesses and gave evidence again himself. He also put in his account book and diary which he had not filed in the civil suit. The District Judge after considering the fresh evidence adhered to the conclusions he had arrived at in his judgment in the appeal from the Subordinate Judge s decision in the civil suit.

(3.) Mr. Rangachariyar who has appeared for the pleader at the hearing of the charge against the pleader in this Court has raised an objection which if well founded would go to the root of the whole proceedings before the District Judge and vitiate his report. That objection is that the Judge was wrong in considering the judgment or the evidence in the civil suit, that the proceedings in the suit were not admissible in evidence at all in the inquiry under the Legal Practitioners Act which he contended was in the nature of a criminal trial and that the charges should have boon established by evidence adduced at the enquiry. He argues that a judgment is not admissible in evidence in any judicial proceeding except in the cases covered by Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Indian Evidence Act, and that none of these sections is applicable to the present case. This contention I am entirely unable to accept. In In the matter of Rajendro Nath Mukerji (1900) I.L.R. 22 All. 49 at p. 63 (P.C.) a pleader who had been convicted of fraudulently using as genuine a document which he knew to be forged was proceeded against for misconduct under paragraph 8 of the Letters Patent of the Allahabad High Court. That Court not only regarded tho judgment convicting the pleader as good evidence of his misconduct but refused to allow the propriety of the conviction to be questioned at the inquiry, and removed his name from the rolls of the Court. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council upheld its procedure. Counsel who appeared for the pleader before the Privy Council did not indeed question the admissibility of the Criminal Judgment in evidence but merely contended that the Court would not in consequence necessarily disbar him and that the learned Judges of the High Court went too far in not allowing the propriety of the conviction to be questioned which counsel maintained was not justified either in law or in fact. The Privy Council dealing with this argument observed "It is plain that the object of the present appeal is to have the judgment of the Sessions Judge and of the High Court on the appeal reviewed and reversed in substance if not in form. This ought not to be allowed. In effect the appellant would indirectly have an appeal against the conviction when if he had petitioned for leave to appeal against it the leave would certainly have boon refused." These observations shew that their Lordships treated the conviction as conclusive evidence of the offence of which the pleader had been convicted. Their Lordships refer to the judgment of Lord Mansfield in In re Brounsall (1778) 2 Cowper s Rep. 829 where that learned Judge observed with reference to proceedings taken against a solicitor who had been convicted of stealing a guinea. "This application is not in the nature of a second trial or a new punishment. But the question is, whether, after that conduct of this man," (i.e., in stealing the guinea, it does not say when, where or how) "it is proper that he should continue a member of a profession which should stand free from all suspicion.... And it is on this principle; that he is an unfit person to practise as an attorney." Lord Mansfield evidenly appears to have regarded the conviction as evidence of the man having committed the offence of theft. Mr. Rangachariar contends that the case before the Allahabad High Court and the cases referred to in the Privy Council judgment therein are distinguishable from the present case, for in those cases the practitioner had been convicted of a serious criminal offence and that such a conviction apart from the question of his being really guilty of the offence or not, would be a sufficient ground for his being regarded as unfit to bo a practitioner in a Court. It is no doubt true that a conviction for felony or other serious offence has been regarded as a sufficient ground for punishing a solicitor or an advocate for misconduct, and Section 12 of the Legal Practitioners Act recognises and gives effect to this view. But what is the principle underlying it? The conviction itself is certainly not misconduct on the part of the pleader convicted. Can it be said that whether the pleader be guilty or not, he having been subjected to the infamy of a conviction he must be further punished by the Court in its disciplinary jurisdiction over its practitioners? I do not think that this is the reason for punishing a pleader The Court is not bound to, nor does it always altogether remove a pleader from the exercise of his profession on the ground of his conviction of a criminal offence. It may inflict a lighter punishment by suspending him for a period. If the infamy due to conviction be the ground of punishment one would suppose that if it makes him unfit to practise he must be regarded as unfit to do so for ever and not for a period only. But as already observed the Court, having regard to the gravity of the offence, the extenuating circumstances, if any, and taking all the facts of the case into consideration, has the power in the interests of the public and of the profession to award such punishment to the pleader, or no punishment at all. I am of opinion that the reason for punishing a person who has been convicted is that the conviction is good evidence of the commission by the pleader of the offence in question. But, assuming that the conviction itself is regarded as good cause for punishing the pleader, would not a similar principle apply where a civil court has found the pleader guilty of grave misconduct which requires that he should be dealt with by the Court under its disciplinary jurisdiction? I see no reason why it should not. The principle would of course not apply where the conduct of the pleader was not the direct issue in the Court which found him guilty of misconduct but only arose incidentally in a litigation between other parties. Such was the case in In re Lubech (1906) I.L.R. 33 Calc. 151 (P.C.), In this case the suit related to the very misconduct charged against the pleader in the present proceedings and I Bee no reason for holding that the judgment and the proceedings in the civil suit are not admissible in evidence. With respect to the conteution that the judgment would not be relevant on the question of the pleader s guilt under any of the sections of the Indian Evidence Act, I do not think it presents any serious difficulty. It appears to me on the other hand to be a rather bold argument to urge that the finding in proceedings against the pleader in which the question was exactly the same as at the present enquiry should be regarded as irrelevant. There is no reason why it should not come within the provisions of Section 11 of the Indian Evidence Act which lays down that "Facts not otherwise relevant are relevant if by themselves or in connection with other facts they make the existence or non-existence of any fact in issue or relevant fact highly probable or improbable."