(1.) The appellant brought the suit out of which this appeal arises for redemption of a kanom and for other reliefs. The first defendant is the kanomdar whose mortgage was sought to be redeemed. He died after the action and his legal representative is the first respondent in this appeal. The property in suit is trust property and defendants 2 and 9 in the action were the urallars or the trustees of the devaswom.
(2.) The main defence is that in proceedings under the Malabar Tenancy Act the first defendant got a renewal under Section 25 of the Act that the renewal which he obtained was still subsisting and that therefore the suit for redemption was premature. Both the lower Courts upheld this contention and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. Hence this appeal.
(3.) It appears that the jenmis, that is, defendants 2 to 9 as representing the devaswom of which they are the urallars, filed O.S. No. 556 of 1931 for redemption of the mortgages of both the present plaintiff and of the present first defendant. In that suit the present plaintiff, the melcharthdar, was the second defendant and the present first defendant was the third defendant. The present first defendant filed an application under Section 22 of the Malabar Tenancy Act asking for a renewal of his kanom. Notice was given to the other parties and the Court registered this application as an independent application, I.A. No. 884 of 1932, and passed an order, Ex. IV, on the 5 of January, 1934, upholding the applicant's right to obtain a renewal. Time was granted for the payment of certain monies which had to be paid under Section 24 of the Act and the matter was adjourned to the 26 of that month. The money was paid a few days beyond the time fixed but the Court evidently excused that delay and accepted the deposit made by the applicant and passed an order under Section 25 directing the execution of a renewal deed, the effect of which under Sub-section 3 of Section 25 is that the tenant shall be entitled to enjoy the holding for 12 years. In this case the Court directed that the renewal should operate for a period of 12 years from the 1 of Vrichigam 1103 which corresponds to 16 November, 1927. If this order is binding on the plaintiff it is clear that the renewal in favour of the first defendant was operative till 1939 at any rate, and the present suit filed in 1931 is liable to be dismissed.