King, J - (1.)The petitioner here filed a suit in the Court of the District Munsif of Tanuku for the division of property held by her husband's relations on the assertion that her husband died divided from them and that a release deed executed by him in their favour was not binding upon her. She sued also for cancellation of that release deed. Court-fee was paid in two sums, one for the general relief of the division and recovery of property and one for the cancellation of the release deed. The suit was dismissed on the ground that there was no division in status between the husband of the plaintiff and the other members of his family. In the course of the judgment a finding was given that the release deed was brought about by undue influence and was therefore not binding on the widow. This finding, as will be seen, had no material effect upon the result of the suit which had to be dismissed because the plaintiff's husband had died as a member of a joint family. The plaintiff appealed against the decree dismissing her suit and at first sought to pay court-fee only upon the main prayer in her suit for the recovery of her husband's estate. In an order dated 3 March 1937, however, the learned Subordinate Judge of Narsapur called upon her to pay court-fee also upon the prayer in the plaint in the lower Court for cancellation of the release deed. That court-fee was paid on the 5 April, 1937. The appeal remained pending for another two years and came up for hearing in 1939. By that time a new Subordinate Judge had succeeded the Judge who had passed the order of March, 1937. The new Subordinate Judge once again discussed the question of court-fee and held that the method of valuation of the court-fee payable upon the relief for the cancellation of the release deed in the lower court was defective and that upon the true method of valuation further court-fee was payable. An order was therefore passed on the 27 June, 1939 that the plaintiff should pay Rs. 405 deficit court-fee on the plaint and Rs. 405 deficit court-fee upon the memorandum of appeal. It is against that order that the present revision petition has been filed.
(2.)This petition will have to be decided upon a consideration of Section 12 of the Court-Fees Act. Section 12 runs as follows: (i) Every question relating to valuation for the purpose of determining the amount of any fee chargeable under this chapter on a plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be decided by the Court in which such plaint or memorandum, as the case may be, is filed, and such decision shall be final as between the parties to the suit. (ii) But whenever any such suit comes before a Court of appeal, reference or revision, if such Court considers that the said question has been wrongly decided to the detriment of the revenue, it shall require the party by whom such fee has been paid to pay so much additional fee as would have been payable had the question been rightly decided, and the provisions of S, 10, paragraph ii, shall apply.
(3.)It will at once be apparent that the learned Subordinate Judge's order falls into two portions, one of which purports to be under Section 12 (1) and the other under Section 12 (2). So far as the memorandum of appeal is concerned, the learned Judge is acting under Section 12 (1). So far as the plaint is concerned the learned judge is acting as a Court of appeal under Section 12 (2). There is nothing in Section 12 (2) which states that a Court may not reconsider an order which it has already passed under that sub-section. It seems to me therefore that it cannot be successfully argued that that part of the learned Subordinate Judge's order which calls upon the appellant to pay a deficit court-fee on the plaint is without jurisdiction. As this is a revision petition under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, I can see no ground for interference with that part of the learned Subordinate Judge's order.