KASINATHA AYYAR Vs. UTHUMANSA ROWTHAN
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Moore, J -
(1.) Nammalwar Chetti, in whose favour a mortgage had been executed under a document, dated 25 June 1884, with respect to the properties to which the present appeal relates, brought a suit (Original Suit No. 172 of 1887) on that mortgage and having obtained a decree brought the property to sale in 1890 and purchased certain of the items of property while others were bought by Saminatha Tevan. Of the several items of property thus purchased Nos. 8 to 12 were sold by the purchasers to the brother of Uthumansa Rowthan and Ahammad Bowthan, the first and second respondents, while items 13 and 14 were sold by Nammalwar to Saminatha and by him to the father of the third respondent. The first, second and the father of the third respondent were duly put in possessions of the items of property purchased by them. In 1897 Kasinatha Ayyar, the present appellant, brought a suit (No. 267 of 1897 on the file of the District Munsif of Kumbakonam) on a mortgage document, dated the 8 July 1884, which had been executed in his favour with respect to certain of the properties entered in the mortgage-deed of the 25 June 1884 in favour of Nammalwar. The present first and second respondents were respectively the twelfth and thirteenth defendants in that suit while the father of the third respondent was the sixteenth defendant. The plaintiff (present appellant) obtained a decree in which it was directed, inter alia, that the present respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 should pay him a sum of over Rs. 1,500 and that in default of payment items 8 to 14 of the property mentioned in the mortgage document of the 25 June 1884, together with other properties should be sold subject to the prior charge of Rs. 1,500 together with interest on the land under that mortgage. The present appellant having purchased the land at the sale held in execution of the decree attempted to get possession, but was obstructed by the first, second, third and fourth respondents. He accordingly presented a petition to the District Munsif under Secs.318 and 335, Civil Procedure Code. The District Munsif having dismissed his petition and the District Judge having on appeal declined to interfere, this appeal against the appellate order has been preferred here.
(2.) In his petition to the District Munsif the appellant stated that the fourth respondent was in possession of a thatched house which belonged to the defendants Nos. 1 to 7 in Original Suit No. 267 of 1897, but which the fourth respondent was living in under a right obtained from them. It was alleged that these defendants had instigated the fourth respondent to prevent the appellant getting possession of the house. The fourth respondent did not appear before the District Munsif and the question as to the house which he is in possession of is not alluded to in his order. The District Judge held that the order relating to him must; be considered to have been passed under Section 335, Civil Procedure Code, and that there was consequently no appeal against that order. The District Judge appears to be right. The fourth respondent claims under an alienation made by the defendants Nos. 1 to 7 in Original Suit No. 267 of 1897 after the date of the decree in that suit; As this respondent is not a judgment-debtor and as it has not been shown that he has resisted the attempt of the appellant to get possession on behalf of any one of the judgment-debtors, it must be held that his case comes under Section 335 of the Civil Procedure Code and that there was consequently no appeal against the order of the District Munsif in so far as it related to him.
(3.) The District Judge has further held that there is no appeal against the order of the District Munsif in so far as it affects respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3. I cannot uphold this decision. Even if the plaintiff, the purchaser of the lands, were not the decree-holder, I am decidedly of opinion that, following the decisions in Prosunno Coomar Sanyal V/s. Kasi Das Sanyal L.R. 19 I.A. 166 : I.L.R. 19 Cal. 683, Ishan Chunder Sirkar V/s. Beni Madhub Sirkar I.L.R. 24 Calc. 62 and Dwar Buksh Sirkar V/s. Fatik Jali I.L.R. 26 Calc. 250, he must be held to be a representative of the judgment-creditor. In the present case the purchaser is the decree-holder, the plaintiff in the suit. It would be impossible to hold that having been a party to the decree, he ceased to be a party because he purchased the property at the sale held in execution. The only point therefore to be decided is whether the question as to which the parties to the present proceedings are at issue is one relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree ( Section 244, Civil Procedure Code). The present application being one by the purchaser of the lands to be put in possession must be held to be a step in aid of execution (vide Moti Lal V/s. Makund Singh I.L.R. 19 All. 477, Sariatoolla Holla V/s. Raj Kumar Boy I.L.R. 27 Calc. 709, and Lakshmanan Chettiar V/s. Kannammal I.L.R. 24 Mad. 186 and such being the case the question at issue is clearly one relating to the execution of the decree and, as has already been pointed out, it is between the parties to the decree. The order of the District Munsif was therefore one passed under Section 244, Civil Procedure Code, and an appeal lay from it.;
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