(1.) THE applicant Bhanwarsingh has been convicted of defamation and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 40. The case was tried while the Magistrate was on tour, and the grounds of revision attack his procedure in allowing only one day's adjournment after charge was framed, with the result that the defence counsel did not appear in the case. It was by no means incumbent on the Court to give a longer adjournment. The case was a petty one, and the tour programme had been announced beforehand. Complainant's pleader was present: so there was nothing to prevent accused's pleader from similarly being present. The latter sent a telegram asking for adjournment but it was not despatched until after Court hours on the 26th and it did not arrive until after proceedings were over on the 27th. A Court is not obliged to pay any attention to such telegrams: see Emperor v. Kolhatkar (1910) 6 NLR 129 at p. 132. It is also not the ease that the ac-cused could not have cross-examined more if he wanted to. He had already cross-examined Hira Singh and Hira (P. Ws. 2 and 3) on the 26th.
(2.) ANOTHER point of procedure is stressed although not mentioned in the grounds, viz. that the accused was examined after charge was framed and not before. No case has been cited to me which shows that this procedure, although unusual, is wrong, or, in other words, that the examination of the accused before framing charge is compulsory. What Section 342, Criminal P.C. says is that the accused shall be questioned after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his defence. That was done in the present case. The Section also says that the Court may at any stage of the trial question the accused, which means that failure to do so before the other examination is no irregularity. Section 254, Criminal P.C, deals with the framing of a charge and says that it may be framed when such evidence (i.e. evidence for the prosecution) and examination (i. e. examination of the accused) have been taken and made, or at any previous stage of the case. One previous stage of the case is when the evidence has been completed and the examination has not been made. The Section therefore itself makes it allowable to frame the charge before examining the accused as well as before recording all the evidence. I therefore find no irregularity in the procedure, and even if there were, the accused has not been prejudiced.
(3.) THERE is good authority for holding that to say a man is an outcast when he has not been outcasted ia to defame him. Such con-duet is to be distinguished from the permissible course of bringing up an allegation before a caste panchayat for a decision whether the person complained against should be outcasted or not. It is also permissible to refuse personally to have anything to do socially with a caste fellow of whose con-duct one disapproves, but it is a different matter to dub him an outcast and induce other persons to boycott him before there has been a decision of the caste in which the person accused has been given a fair hearing. I need only refer to cases like Babulal v. Tundilal (1932)19 AIR Nag 97, Queen v. Vidya Sankara Narasimha (1883) 6 Mad 381 and Cuppusawmi Chetty v. Duraisami Chetty (1910) 33 Mad 67. In the present case the accused has not plea-ded justification under any of the exceptions but has denied the libel altogether. It is proved that he did act as alleged. The out-casting due to his attitude has continued, and he has never withdrawn his insinuations. The delay in bringing the complaint has been considered, It by itself was no ground for acquitting the accused. It seems clear that he was actuated by malice. As he himself was outcasted because he had been to jail, he was jealous of his step-brother whom he disliked; and adopted this method of getting him outcasted also. There is no good ground for revision. The application is dismissed.