Amberson Marten, C J - (1.)There are two points argued before us in this appeal, namely, first, whether judgment was rightly entered for plaintiff No. 2 as well as for plaintiff No. 1, and, secondly, whether interest prior to the suit was rightly awarded.
(2.)With regard to the first point, plaintiff No. 2 claims to be the assignee of plaintiff No. 1, and it is argued that the subject of the assignment was not a "debt" and therefore an "actionable claim" within the meaning of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, but was a mere right to sue within the meaning of Section 6(e), and so could not be transferred. The defendants interest in getting the judgment limited to plaintiff No. 1 is that they allege that they have a cross-decree and so we understand a cross-claim against plaintiff No. 1 which possibly they would be unable to enforce if the judgment were in favour of plaintiff No. 2 as well. As regards the decree, that we understand is the decree in suit No. 1791 of 1923 referred to at the end of the learned Judge's judgment. We are informed that that decree is now under appeal to this Court in Appeal No. 311 of 1925.
(3.)The subject-matter of the assignment arose out of three cross-transactions between plaintiff No. 1 and the defendants for the August, September a October, vayadas of 1920, namely, for 175 bales, 75 bales, and 25 bales, respectively. It is important to observe that as regards each vayada the sales exactly counterbalanced the purchases, and consequently on balance there were no bales to be delivered or taken. Similarly, under those circumstances the exact rate of the vayada is immaterial because the same rate had to be applied on both sides of the account with regard to each of the said contracts making up the aggregate number of bales for the particular vayada. The effect, therefore, as a matter of arithmetic, was that there were to be mere payments of differences as regards each vayada and they amounted approximately to Rs. 2,091, Rs. 2,615, and Rs. 660, for the three vayadas in question. The appellants argue that although this was the net financial result, yet the sums were really damages for breach of contract, and accordingly on authority the plaintiff had merely a right to sue for recovering the amount, and accordingly the transfer was invalid under Section 6(e).