SUKHAMAL BANSIDHAR Vs. BABU LAL KEDIA AND CO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These four revisions arise out of four orders of the District Judge of Cawnpore, dated each of them the 11th of September, 1919, directing (inter alia) four awards to be filed. The awards had been made by a sole arbitrator who had been appointed by one of the disputing parties only, to decide disputes which had arisen between two firms, one the present applicants, Sukhamal Bansidhar, who are traders in cloth in Cawnpore, and the other Babu Lal Kedia & Co. who are importers in Delhi, apparently with a branch office also in Cawnpore, with reference to four contracts or indents numbered respectively 415, 416, 417 and 418, relating to the sale of cloth goods. The sellers, namely, Babu Lal Kedia are members of an Association in Delhi known as the Delhi Piece Goods Association, which, following the example of commercial firms in England, and other places, endeavors, as far as possible, to remove from the ordinary law courts disputes which arise upon purely trade questions and to have them decided by arbitrators or surveyors experienced in the trade, well-known to the traders, who may be taken to be competent to give prompt and satisfactory decisions on points which arise every day over contracts between traders, and in which the same ready appreciation by ordinary courts of law cannot, in the natural course of things, be expected. This Association has adopted a definite form of contract or indent in which provisions regarding arbitration are. contained, and which include various additions to or modifications of the Indian Arbitration Act, IX of 1899, and they have also printed on the reverse side of the Indent " General Survey and Arbitration Rules." The construction of a very important provision contained in these rules is involved in the question which now comes before us. On a general reading of these rules it would appear that the intention is that the surveyor, as he is called, should hold meetings with the surveyor or arbitrator of the other side to examine the goods on behalf of the party whom he represents, although it by no means follows from the rules that that is necessarily so; but a general reading of the rules makes it clear that the survey and the arbitration, although these terms are used interchangeably, are two separate and distinct things. It is perhaps no business of ours, but it follows from the discussion which has taken place in this case, which has been very thoroughly argued on both sides, and from the view which we have formed about this rule, that it is desirable that some of the rules of this Association should be amended with a view to greater simplicity in expressing the intention a very laudable intention--of their framers.

(2.) It is hardly necessary in these days to repeat that the courts will not set aside an award on the ground that the arbitrators have gone wrong, or that the finding appears to them to be erroneous or unfair, and further, for the same reason that no appeal is allowed against the decision of an umpire or arbitrator, no revision against it can be entertained. That view was laid down very clearly by the Privy Council in the leading case of Ghulam Khari v. Muhammad Hassan (1901) I.L.R. 29 Calc. 167, in 1901, and has been consistently followed by the courts in India.

(3.) As no point was taken before us to-day that we bad no jurisdiction in revision for very good reason, because, if it had been a good point it would only have resulted in the applicants making a fresh application for extension of time to appeal which would have re-opened the whole question in another form, we are not called upon to decide whether or not an appeal lies from such an order as the one complained of in this case, namely, filing an award under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act of 1899. That may be a difficult technical question. Of course, if an appeal lies, no revision can be entertained by the express terms of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and upon that question I prefer to keep an open mind, merely assuming that as no objection has been taken and as no appeal has in fact been brought, no appeal in fact lies.