Sadasiva Ayyar, J - (1.)The plaintiff is the appellant in this Second Appeal. He is the purchaser from the reversioner to the estate of one Gurappa. Gurappa died in 1883, leaving two widows as his heirs. The younger widow on receipt of rupees thirty gave up all her rights (about six months after her husband s death) in favour of the elder widow under the deed, Exhibit E. I agree with the Lower Appellate Court on the construction of Exhibit E, that she thereby gave up her whole life-interest in her husband s estate, whether that interest might have extended beyond the lifetime of the elder widow or whether it would have come to an end during the lifetime of the elder widow. The elder widow died in 1902 and the younger widow in 1914, and the present suit was brought by the purchaser from the male reversioner in 1916. The learned District Judge dismissed the suit on the preliminary ground of limitation. His argument was, that by the junior widow giving up her right of survivorship (if she happened to survive the senior widow), the senior widow not only represented the whole widow s estate during her own lifetime, but that on her death, the fact that the junior widow was still living was no obstacle to prevent the reversioners from coming in, the junior widow s relinquishment having accelerated the succession of the male reversioner, and as such acceleration took place in 1902 and the suit was brought in 1916, the plaintiff was barred under Article 144 of the Limitation Act.
(2.)It was argued before us, in the first place, by the Appellant s learned vakil that the senior widow on her death owned a sort of stridhanam in her husband s property which was inherited by her own heirs, that the junior widow was the heir to that stridhanam estate (which however lasted only till the junior widow died in 1914), and that the reversioner became entitled to inherit the whole of the husband s estate only afterwards; and reliance was placed on Pappammal v. Venkatasami Naiker S.A. No. 356 of 1918 (unreported.). As this question of the right of a widow who had parted with her rights to her co-widow to inherit the right again on the death of the co-widow is said to be under consideration before another Bench of this Court, and as I feel doubts as to an estate surrendered by a widow to a co-widow constituting in some sense or to any extent the property of the surrenderee held by her in a different capacity from that of the widow of her husband. I shall not deal with this question further in this case, it not being necessary for the purpose of deciding this Second Appeal to express a final opinion on that question.
(3.)The next point is whether there was this acceleration of the right of the male reversioner on the death of the elder widow. Acceleration by surrender to the next male reversioner (which I take it, means a surrender known to and accepted by him) is, no doubt, known to the law.