GANNE KOTAPPA Vs. VENKATARAMIAH
LAWS(PVC)-1900-10-9
PRIVY COUNCIL
Decided on October 31,1900

GANNE KOTAPPA Appellant
VERSUS
VENKATARAMIAH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

- (1.) Notwithstanding the fact that for more than thirty years sperial or second appeals against judgment in cases originally tried before the Collector under Act VIII of 1865 have been frequently heard without any question being raised, Mr. Kuppuswami Aiyar had the courage to argue that no second appeal is maintainable in Such cases and he based his arguments on the language of sections 4 and 584 of the Civil P. C..
(2.) Section 4 is a new section in so far as it relates to suits between landholders and their tenants. In the? Code of 1859 there was no similar provision and, therefore, it may fairly be said that the cases decided while it. was in force, including the case in which it is held generally that the provisions of the Code are to be applied to suits which originate in a Collector's Court, are not conclusive to show that a second appeal lies. Nevertheless the known state of the law as it existed before the present Code was enacted is a fact to be taken into account when we come to consider what was meant by the saving provision contained in Section 4 of the Code. The section so far as is material is as follows:Save as provided in the second paragraph of Section 3, nothing herein contained shall be deemed to affect any local law prescribing a special procedure for suits "between landlord and tenant."
(3.) Paraphrasing this section, one may say that it means that any law prescribing a special procedure for the suits specified shall remain unaffected by the provisions of the Code. That is a very different thing from, saying that the provisions of the Code are not to apply to such suits, and yet that is the meaning that the exigencies of the respondent's argument require to have put on the words. In our opinion the sectios of the Code relating to ? second appeal inasmuch as they relate to matters which are not touched by Act VIII of 1861) may be applied to suits under that Act without affecting the enactment, that is to say, without altering or modifying the processual law therein enacted. If the Legislature meant to say that those sections and other sections of the Code were not to apply at all, surely it is reasonable to suppose, particularly when regard is had to the law as understood at that time, that express language to that effect would have been used. In our judgment Section 4 cannot be used in support of the respondent's argument.;


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