LAXMI DEVI Vs. MEENA MISHRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) AT this stage it is to be decided whether the delay in preferring this appeal can be condoned and whether the appellant has been able to make out sufficient cause for condoning the delay. A decree for specific performance of contract was passed against the appellant on 18. 12. 1986 by the Addl. District Judge No. 1, Bharatpur, by which the defendant respondent was to deposit a sum of Rs. 2,0c0/- within one month, upon which the plaintiff-appellant was to execute a registered sale-deed. It was also ordered that in case the defendant appellant failed to execute a sale-deed, the plaintiff respondent could apply before the Court, who would execute the same on behalf of the defendant. This appeal was preferred on 13. 11. 1987. The appellant applied for a copy of judgment and decree on 9. 10. 1987 and the same was delivered to him on 14 10. 1987.

(2.) THE learned counsel for the appellant has in support of this application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, contended that it was under the mistaken advice of a lawyer that this appeal was not preferred within limitation. According to the appellant's affidavit, she was advised that a final decree would be prepared and she could prefer an appeal against a final decree. THE Advocate, who gave this advice to her has also filed his affidavit and his name is Rajendra Kumar. He has deposed that the appellant came to him on 24. 12. 1986, for purposes of seeking advice to prefer an appeal against the judgment dated 18. 12. 1986 and he after looking into the provisions of Order 34 C. P. C. advised her that she can file an appeal after a final decree is prepared in the execution proceedings.

(3.) IN the case of State of West Bengal V. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality (4), the expression "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Act has been explained and it has been said that it should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide, is imputable to a party. Pursuing other remedy than appeal on wrong advice by counsel was held to be sufficient cause.