- (1.)THE plaintiff has been unsuccessful in both the courts below and his appeal is now directed against the judgment of Senior Civil Judge, Bundi, dated May 11, 1967.
(2.)THE facts are quite simple and are not in dispute. THE plaintiff owns a house in Bundi, of which the description has been given in the plaint. THEre was an open piece of land belonging to the Municipal Board lying towards the south of the plaintiff's property. THE plaintiff wanted to purchase it and an order (Ex. 6) was made by the chairman of the Municipal Board on August 2, 1956, directing that the said piece of land belonging to the Municipal Board may be sold to him after taking its price according to the law. THE plaintiff deposited Rs. 273/- on account of the price on August 8, 1957. THEre was thereafter some dispute between the plaintiff and the Municipal Board and it was not until July 15, 1960 that resolution Ex. 6 was passed by the Municipal Board for the sale of that land to the plaintiff and the issue of a sale certificate to that effect. This was done. , and a registered sale-deed was executed on July 16, 1960. THE Municipal Board, however, informed the plaintiff about a year thereafter that the sale had been cancelled by the State government. THE plaintiff therefore instituted the present suit for a declaration that the suit property was his property, and for the issue of a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from dispossessing him. THE State of Rajas-than was impleaded as a party to the suit, and so also the Administrator of the Municipal Board. THE defendants denied the plaintiff's claim mainly on the ground that the chairman of the Municipal Board had no power to sell the land without proper sanction, and that as the sale was unauthorised, it was cancelled by another order of the Chairman of the Board dated December 12, 1956 and the amount deposited by the plaintiff on account of the price of the land was returned to him by a money order which, however, the plaintiff refused to accept. It was the main defence in the case that no right had accrued to the plaintiff in respect of the alleged sale. As has been stated, both the courts below have upheld the defence, and this has given rise to the present appeal.
It has been argued by Mr. S. M. Mehta, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant, that the order (Ex. 6) of the Chairman of the Municipal Board of August 2, 1956, amounted atleast to an agreement for sale and that as it was ratified by a resolution (Ex. 7) of the Municipal Board dated July 15, 1950, the ratification dated back to August 2, 1956 by virtue of section of 196 of the Contract Act. The learned counsel has thus argued that on account of the ratification referred to in resolution Ex. 7, it should be deemed that there was sanction of the Municipal Board for the sale and that, in turn, would be sufficient to comply with the requirement of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 36 of the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act, 1951. In this way it had been argued that the sale was regular and binding and that the two courts have erred in taking a contrary view. It may be mentioned that the learned counsel has frankly conceded that he cannot invoke the provisions of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959, in support of the plaintiff's claim in the suit.

The question therefore is whether there is any force in this line of argument of the learned counsel for the appellant.

It cannot be doubted, and has not been disputed, that order Ex. 6 of the Chairman dated August 2, 1956, for the sale of the suit land to the plaintiff, did not amount to a sale within the meaning of Sec. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act because there was, on that date, no registered instrument of sale. At best, therefore, the order of the Chairman may be said to be a contract for the sale of immovable property. But here again, by virtue of the said sec. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, it did not, itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. The question then remains whether such a contract for sale was valid on the date of the Chairman's order i. e. on August 2, 1956. On that date the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act, 1951 was in force and sub sec. (7) of sec. 36 of that Act required, inter alia, that besides the signature of the Chairman, any contract on behalf of the Municipality shall bear the signatures of two other members of the Board and carry its common seal. It is admitted that this requirement was not fulfilled in regard to the alleged agreement for sale. It could not therefore be binding by virtue of sub sec. (8) of sec. 36 which clearly provided that no contract would be binding on a Municipal Board unless the requirement of sec. 36 had been complied with. In face of this mandatory requirement of the law, the so called contract for sale, relied on by the plaintiff, was a void contract. Reference for this view may be made to Chauthmal vs. the State of Rajasthan (l) and Dr. H. S. Rikhy vs. the New Delhi Municipal Committee (2 ).

Therefore it is obvious that the so called contract for sale which emanated from the Chairman's order Ex. 6 was a void contract, and it could not have been ratified under sec. 196 of the Contract Act. It follows therefore that the subsequent resolution Ex. 7 of the Municipal Board dated July 15, 1960, for the sale of the land in favour of the plaintiff, could not be read as ratification of the Chairman's order Ex. 6. The plea that the resolution amounted to ratification and validated the alleged contract of sale dated August 2, 1956, cannot therefore be of any avail to the plaintiff and to be rejected.

When this is so, the plaintiff could succeed in the suit only if he had succeeded in proving that the sale, which was made in pursuance of resolution Ex. 7 of the Municipal Board dated July 15, 1960, was in accordance with the requirements of sec. 80 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 which had come into force in the meantime and had repealed the earlier Act of 1951. But, as has been stated, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has not invoked the provisions of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 to support the plaintiff's claim in the suit. I have no doubt that this stand of the learned counsel is quite correct because the said sec. 80 placed stringent restrictions on the competence of the Municipal Board to sell immovable property, otherwise than by auction, of any value exceeding Rs. 200/ -. It is not therefore possible for the plaintiff to take the plea that the sale which was made in pursuance of the resolution dated July 15, 1960, was valid under the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959.

The appeal must therefore fail and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs throughout. It may be mentioned that Mr. Lekh Raj Mehta has stated that the Municipal Board is always willing to refund the amount deposited by the plaintiff for the sale which has fallen through and it would therefore be open to the appellant to obtain its refund. .

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