KAN SINGH, J. - (1.)THIS is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by one Chouthmal and by it he challenges the validity of an order of the Revenue Appellate Authority, Jaipur dated 5-9-63 (Ex. 3) and prays for an appropriate writ, direction or order. The relevant facts are briefly theses - The subject-matter of the dispute is a plot of Nazul land (Plot No. A2) situated at Dausa within the Municipal limits. Prior to the establishment of the Municipal Board in Dausa certain municipal functions were being performed by a body known as Town Improvement Board under a Government notification which ran as follows:- "jaipur, January 6,/march 7, 1963. No. F. l (K) (l)/l. S. G. /53.- It is hereby notified for general information that the Government have been pleased to constitute a Town Improvement Board at Dausa with the following personnel: - (1) Sub-Divisional Officer, Dausa. . . Convenor. (2) Shri Triveni Shyam Sharma, M. L. A. Member, (3) Shri Chairman, Municipal Board, Dausa - do - (4) Shri Shiv Sahaijoshi, Dausa - do - (5) Assistant Engineer, Dausa - do - The Town Improvement Board can copt 2 more members when necessary. " THIS Town Improvement Board functioned at Dausa till it had come to be abrogated by another Government notification dated 19-9 61 published in the Rajasthan Gazette of 26th October, 1961. The petitioner's case is that plot No. A2 was put to auction by the Town Improvement Board and the petitioner was the highest bidder for purchasing the same. However, according to the petitioner, though he had deposited the one fourth price and from time to time offered to pay the remaining three-fourth, the formalities for the sale of the plot could not be completed while the Town Improvement Board was functioning. It appears (that while the Town Improvement Board was functioning, a Municipality was also functioning at Dausa under the Town Municipalities Act, 1961, but the said Municipality was not entrusted with the powers of selling Nazul land lying within the Municipal area. In the year 1959, Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 was passed and a new Board under that Act was constituted and the Town Improvement Board was abolished and its functions were taken over by the Municipal Board, Dausa. The petitioner avers that he pursued the matter regarding the sale with the Municipal Board, Dausa and by its resolution dated 11-11-62 the Board directed the issue of patta in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner having already deposited the one-fourth of the sale price, that is, Rs. 450/-, he deposited the remainder, that is, Rs. 1172/3/- and on 9-12-62 a patta was issued in favour of the petitioner in respect of this land. It further appears that before the land was auctioned respondent No. 1, Truck Union was introduced on the land as a tenant and it was paying monthly rent to the erst-while Town Improvement Board for the same. Respondent No. 1 was also desirous of purchasing this land and had made several attempts to get the same. I am not concerned with the old history, but it appears that when the Truck Union found that a resolution had been passed for giving the land to the petitioner the Truck Union made an application to the Additional Collector, Jaipur against the order of the Municipal Board, Dausa for selling the land to respondent No. 1. The Additional Collector went into the matter, but found that there was nothing wrong with the sale and accordingly he rejected the application of respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 1 then filed an application under sec. 300 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959, hereinafter referred as the "act", before the Revenue Appellate Authority, Jaipur. The Revenue Appellate Authority held by the impugned order that the sale in favour of the petitioner by the Municipal Board was in contravention of law as the approval of the Collector had not been taken. According to the Revenue Appellate Authority, the sale being for an amount exceeding Rs. 200/- approval of the Collector was necessary according to sec. 80 of the Act. In these circumstances the Revenue Appellate Authority set aside the resolution of the Municipal Board, Dausa dated 11-11-62 as also the order of the Additional Collector, Jaipur dated 28-2-63 and directed the refund of the sale price to the petitioner.
(2.)IN assailing the validity of the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority it is contended by the petitioner that the land in question having not been vested in the Municipal Board under the provisions of the Act, it was not necessary for the Municipal Board to have taken the approval of the Collector for the sale. It is maintained that all Nazul lands were placed at the disposal of the Municipal Boards by a Government notification dated 8-10-59 which was issued under sec. 102 of the Land Revenue Act, 1956 and, therefore, all that was necessary for the Board was to follow the procedure laid down in the notification. IN the alternative it is submitted that by his order dated 28-2-63 the Additional Collector, Jaipur should be taken to have approved of the sale and this approval, according to the petitioner, was sufficient to meet the requirements of sec. 80 of the Act. It is also contended that the Revenue Appellate Authority has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter and to order the refund of the sale price to the petitioner. It was finally submitted that the Revenue Appellate Authority had overlooked the position that according to sec. 6a of the Act an Additional Collector was a Collector for the purposes of the Act and consequently the approval given by the Additional Collector on 28 2-63 in his order was as good as the approval of the Collector.
The writ petition has been opposed on behalf of the respondents. They deny that the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority was bad. It is maintained that the Revenge Appellate Authority being the delegate of the State Government under sec. 300 of the Act was fully competent to go into the question of the legality of the Collector's order as well as that of the Municipal Board and it could set aside the resolution of the Municipal Board. On behalf of the respondents it is further contended that even in respect of the Nazul lands placed at the disposal of the Municipal Boards sec. 80 of the Act is attracted and where the sale price is more than Rs. 200/- the prior approval of the Collector is necessary. Reliance is also placed for this on Chotmal vs. State of Rajasthan (l ). Then it was finally urged that the Town Improvement Board may have purported to auction the land, but the Municipal Board could not continue the very proceedings and if at all it wanted to sell the land then it should have conducted the auction proceedings de novo and then should have taken its own decision. In other words, whatever act was done by the Town Improvement Board could not have been taken to be the act of the Municipal Board within the meaning of the Act.

The first and foremost question that calls attention is as to whether the Revenue Appellate Authority could have interfered with an order of the kind passed by the Additional Collector in the present case in exercise of its powers under sec. 300 of the Act and if it could do so then what kind of order it could have passed under that section. Learned counsel for the parties could not bring to my notice any provision of the Act other than sec. 285 thereof under which the Collector could have acted in the matter when the Municipal Board had passed a resolution for selling the Nazul land to a party. Sec. 285 of the Act runs as under: - "sec. 285.- Power of suspending execution of order etc. of board - (1) If in the opinion of any such officer as may be appointed or authorised by the State Government in this behalf the execution of any order or resolution of a board, or the doing of anything which is about to be done or is being done by or on behalf of a board is causing or is likely to cause injury or annoyance to the public or a breach of the peace or is unlawful, he may, by order in writing under his signature, suspend the execution or prohibit the doing thereof. (2) When any such officer makes any order under this section he shall forthwith forward to the State Government and to the board affected thereby a copy of the order, with a statement of the reasons for making it, and it shall be in the discretion of the State Government to rescind the order or to direct that it shall continue in force with or without modification, permanently or for such period as it thinks fit; Provided that no order of such officer passed under this section shall be confirmed, revised or modified by the State Government without giving the board reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the said order. "

It is common ground between the parties that the authorised officer within the meaning of sec. 285 (1) of the Act is the Collector by virtue of a Government notification. When a Collector has to act under this section he is to apply his mind to the matter and if it is his opinion that the execution of any order or resolution of the Municipal Board or the doing of anything which is about to be done or is being done by or on behalf of a Board, is causing or is likely to cause injury or annoyance to the public or a breach of the peace or is unlawful, he may, by order in writing under his signature, suspend the execution or prohibit the doing thereof. It is only when the Collector forms the opinion that any resolution of the Municipal Board is causing or is likely to cause injury or annoyance to the public or a breach of the peace or is unlawful that the Collector can suspend the execution or prohibit the doing of the act in question. When he has once passed any order suspending the execution or prohibiting the doing of any act, then he has no choice but to forward to the State Government with a copy to the Board in question his statement of reasons for taking the action and then it shall be in the discretion of the State Government to rescind the order or to direct that it shall continue in force with or without modification, permanently or for such period as it thinks fit. The State Government is under duty before it confirms, revises or modifies the order to afford an opportunity to the Municipal Board of showing cause against the said order.

A perusal of the order of the Additional Collector (Ex. 2) shows that all that he did after considering the legality of the resolution of the Municipal Board for selling the land was to dismiss the application of respondent No. 1. In other words, the Collector did not think fit to take any action under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 285 of the Act. I enquired from learned counsel for the parties if the Collector had passed any order under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 285 of the Act by way of either suspending the execution of the resolution or prohibiting the doing of any act by the Municipal Board. The file of the Municipal Board, that has been called here at the request of the petitioner, does not show whether any such order was passed. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1 has, however, placed on record a copy of the reply submitted by the Municipal Board to respondent No. l's application on 21-2-62 and that reply of the Municipal Board shows that on 14-2-62 the Collector had passed a stay order. I am not concerned whether the Municipal Board was or was not in the wrong in not complying with the stay order in question, but the fact remains that the Collector did pass a stay order. I will be discussing hereinafter as to what the Collector is required to do once he passes an order for suspending a particular order or resolution of the Municipal Board under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 285 of the Act. I will examine the case on the footing that a stay order was passed by the Collector.

Now the Revenue Appellate Authority may deal with the matter according to the provisions of sec. 300 of the Act. That section reads as under - Sec. 300. Power to call for records - Any officer or authority authorised in this behalf by the State Government may, for the purpose of being satisfied as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed under this Act by a a Collector or other officer appointed by the State Government in that behalf, call for the relevant records and may, in doing so, direct that pending the examination of the records, such order shall be held in abeyance. (2) On examining the records the officer or authority authorised as aforesaid may reverse or modify such order. " It is common ground between the parties that on the relevant date the authority authorised by the State Government for the purposes of exercising powers under sec. 300 of the Act was the Revenue Appellate Authority. Consequently the Revenue Appellate Authority could exercise revisional powers to the extent permissible under sec. 300 of the Act. In plain terms the section authorises the competent authority to call for the records and satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed under this Act by a Collector or any other officer appointed by the State Government in that behalf. In clear terms this section does not authorise the competent authority to call for the record of the Municipal Board and to examine its legality straightway. It is only when the Collector or some other officer has intervened in exercise of his powers under the Act that the revisional authority may while examining the correctness, legality or propriety of the order of the Collector or other officer be able to go into the question of the legality, correctness or propriety of an order passed by the Municipal Board.

Now, in the present case as against the resolution of the Municipal Board, respondent No. 1 applied before the Collector and the latter called for the record and declined to interfere with the resolution of the Municipal Board. Sec. 300, in my view, can if at all it could be utilised in relation to, an order of the Collector be utilised only to the limited extent of passing such an order as the Collector himself could have passed and no further. In other words, if the Collector himself could not have set aside any order of the Municipal Board, the revisional authority under sec. 300 could not do the same. The Legislature has conferred the powers of examining the order of the Collector regarding the suspension of the resolution of the Municipal Board on the Government and, in my view, the powers conferred on the Government under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 285 of the Act cannot be exercised by a revisional authority under sec. 300 of the Act. Were this so, there will be a conflict and while in one case the Government who may ultimately passed some orders, the Revenue Appellate Authority too in dealing with the matter under sec. 300 of the Act might pass quite a different kind of order. Such a conflict cannot be presumed to have been intended by the Legislature and the two sections namely, secs. 300 and 285 of the Act have to be harmoniously construed and they can be so construed if the Revenue Appellate Authority exercising revisional powers under sec. 300 is not held to possess the powers conferred on the State Government under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 285 of the Act. All the same, looking to the wide language of S. 300 in that it empowers the revisional authority to examine the legality, correctness or propriety of any order passed by a Collector the revisional authority could certainly go into the question of the legality of an order passed by the Collector even where he declines to pass any order under sec. 285 of the Act at all. If this were not so, then certain illegal orders passed by a Municipal Board may not be reached at all: For example, a certain Municipal Board sells a land worth Rs. 10,000/-just for Rs. 500/ -. Now, If a Collector were to shut his eyes and decline to take any action under sec. 285, even when he is moved by a party, then there may be no remedy available under the Act to anybody to challenge the legality of the order of the Municipal Board. Sec. 285 contemplates that the Government can take action only when the matter is brought to the notice of the Government by the Collector. Therefore, in my view, it is open to the Revenue Appellate Authority to examine the question whether in the circumstances of the case the Collector should have taken any action under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 285 of the Act and to have reported the matter to the State Government under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 285 of the Act. However, as I have already observed, the Revenue Appellate Authority could not take any action which the Collector being the original Authority under sec. 285 of the Act could not have taken. The Revenue Appellate Authority, in my view, could have only directed the Collector to suspend the resolution of the Board and to report the matter to the State Government so that the State Government may examine the entire question after hearing the Municipal Board and then pass an appropriate order. The matter can be looked at from another angle. In the present case, as I have already observed, the Collector had passed a stay order on 5-12-62 suspending the operation of the resolution of the Municipal Board for selling the land in question to the petitioner. Once the Collector had passed such an order then that could only be in exercise of his powers under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 285 of the Act and after that stage is reached the Collector has no option but to report the matter to the State Government under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 285 of the Act.

In whatever way the question may be looked at the conclusion is irresist-able that the Collector should have brought the matter to the notice of the State Government in the manner laid down by sec. 285 of the Act. In my view,-the matter is such as should be brought to the notice of the Government by the Collector concerned under sec. 285 (2) of the Act and then it will be for the State Government to examine the legality of the resolution of the Municipal Board and then to either rescind the order of the Collector or to direct that it shall continue that order without modification permanently or for such period as it thinks fit. I ought to mention that once he had passed an order of suspension of the resolution, sec. 285 of the Act does not confer any power on the Collector to himself rescind that order of suspension which could only be done by the State Government under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 286 of the Act.

In view of the conclusion that I have reached, I am not called upon to express any opinion about the other contentions raised by learned counsel on either side. It will be for the State Government to examine the contentions when so raised before it in dealing with the matter.

For the above reasons, I allow the writ petition in part and set aside that part of the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority whereby it had purported to set aside the order of the Municipal Board of 11-11-62. However, I allow the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority to stand in so far as it has reversed the order of the Additional Collector, Jaipur dated 28-2-63. I further direct the Additional Collector to send a copy of his stay order dated 5 12-62 to the State Government with a statement of reasons. He will frame the statement of reasons on the basis of what the Revenue Appellate Authority has said in its order dated 5-9-63. Further he will give a copy of such statement of reasons as also that of the stay order to the Municipal Board. It will than be for the State Government to deal with the matter under sec. 285 (2) of the Act.

The parties are left to bear their own costs of this writ petition. .

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