CHHUTANLAL Vs. STATE
LAWS(RAJ)-1967-5-3
HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
Decided on May 10,1967

CHHUTANLAL Appellant
VERSUS
STATE Respondents

JUDGEMENT

- (1.) THIS revision application has arisen in the following circumstances.
(2.) IN Jaipur City, Mst. Bhori wife of the petitioner is said to have been murdered on the night intervening 24th and 25th July, 1964 while the petitioner was in jail in regard to some other offence. While investigating the case of murder, the police took in its charge the house in which Mst. Bhori was murdered as also the moveable property then found in the house purporting to act under Section 25 of the Police Act, 1861, (hereinafter called the Act ). An inventory of the said property was furnished to the Additional District Magistrate, Jaipur who directed the property to remain in police custody. Thereafter the petitioner from jail submitted an application on 3rd December, 1964, to hand over the said property to his second wife Mst. Lilita. This application was addressed to the Additional Munsif magistrate, Jaipur City who ordered the property to be delivered to Mst. Lilita on 6th January, 1965. A revision application was preferred against the order and on a reference being made, a learned Judge of this Court, set aside the order of the munsif Magistrate as being without jurisdiction and ordered that the matter should be disposed of by the District Magistrate in accordance with the provisions of section 26 of the Act. The objection which is now being raised, does not seem to have been then raised. When the matter came up again before the District magistrate, he issued a proclamation regarding the entire property both moveable and immoveable as required by Section 26 of the Act. For the interim management of the house and realisation of rent he appointed a receiver. Being aggrieved by the order of appointment of the receiver, the petitioner has preferred the present revision application, and it has been contended on his behalf that under Section 25 of the Act, the police is not empowered to take charge of the immoveable property and as such the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to issue any proclamation with regard to it. Section 25 of the Act is as follows: "it shall be the duty of every police officer to take charge of all unclaimed property, and to furnish an inventory thereof to the magistrate of the District. The police officers shall be guided as to the disposal of such property by such orders as they shall receive from the magistrate of district. " according to the definition in the interpretation clause, the word "property" shall include any moveable property, money or valuable security. The contention for the petitioner is that although the word 'include' is generally used to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute, but in the present case the context of the Act showand that it was not employed for the purpose of adding to the natural significance of the word 'property' but to restrict its meaning so as to afford an exhaustive explanation Mr. Kasliwal for the non-petitioner has strenuously urged that according to its ordinary connection property includes both immoveable and moveable property and here the word include has an extending force and does not limit the meaning of the term to the substance of the definition. In support he relies on Calico Mills Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, air 1961 Madh Pra 257, S. M. James v. Dr. Abdul Khair, AIR 1961 Pat 242, sujaniram Daryaosingh v. Lal Shvamshah Bhagwan Shah. AIR 1956 Nag 67,
(3.) IN Dilworth v. Commr. of Stamps, 1899 AC 99, Lord Watson observed: "the word 'include' is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words and phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation Clause declares that they shall include. But the word 'include' is susceptible of another construction, which may become imperative, if the context of the Act is sufficient to show that it was not merely employed for the purpose of adding to the natural significance of the words or expressions defined. It may be equivalent to 'mean and include' and in that case it may afford an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions. ";


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