Decided on November 30,1967



KAN SINGH, J. - (1.) THE case comes up for orders on an office report dated 28-11-67. In the writ petition filed by Messrs Mannalal Shiv Kumar against the Regional Transport Authority, Bikaner Region, Bikaner and others, the petitioners moved an application for stay and claimed therein the following relief - "it is, therefore, prayed that pending the disposal of the writ petition the respondents No. 1 be restrained from issuing permits to respondents Nos. 3 to 11 or to such of them whom it has not been issued so far and the respondent No. 2 be restrained from countersigning the permits temporary or permanent on Jhunjhunu-Sardarshahar route, and respondents Nos. 3 to 11 be restrained from plying on Jhunjhunu-Sardarshabar route. " A court-fee stamp of Rs. 2/- was affixed on this application and the Office reports that this was not sufficient. Learned counsel for the petitioner contests the office-report. A notice of the application was also ordered to be given to the learned Government Advocate and I have heard Shri H. C. Rastogi for the petitioner and Shri Shrimal, learned Deputy Government Advocate on the question. THE matter in my view falls to be considered on the interpretation of Art. 11 (g) and (s) of the Second Schedule of the Rajasthan Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, (Act No. 23 of 1961) 1961, hereinafter to be referred as the "act" and I may read the two provisions - Article Particulars Proper fee "11 (g) Application for arrest or attachment before judgment or for temporary injunction: (i) when presented to a Civil Court other than the High Court in relation to any suit or proceedings; . . . One rupee (ii) When presented to the High Court . . . Five rupees" "11 (s) Application or petition presented to the High Court and not otherwise specifically provided for . . . Two rupees" THE opening words of Art. 11 (g) provide the clue to what was contemplated in the said Article. THE words "for temporary injunction" have to be construed in the light of what has preceded these words. THE applications for temporary injunction that are contemplated therein are, in my view, applications made under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in proceedings before the Civil Courts including the High Court in its ordinary civil jurisdiction. This, in my view, does not cover applications for seeking interim relief in the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Article 226 of the Constitution inter alia provides that every High Court shall have power to issue to any person or authority including in appropriate cases, any Government directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari or any of them for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. THE power to be exercised by the High Courts shall not be in derogation of the powers conferred on the Supreme Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution. In exercise of these powers the High Court may give relief at the conclusion of the proceedings before it or may grant an interim relief whenever necessary. This is the Article which will have to be invoked for either of the reliefs. In other words, this Article empowers the High Court both to give a final relief on the conclusion of the proceedings before it, or to grant interim relief during the pendency of the proceedings before it. THErefore, when a party makes an application before the High Court for the grant of a stay order during the pendency of a writ petition, then it is really invoking the powers of the High Court under this Article. THE writ, direction or order that the High Court may issue may at times partake of the character of an injunction, but all the same that writ, direction or order will not be tantamount to the issuing of an injunction under any of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in terms.
(2.) IN the present case the petitioner has really invoked the powers of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution though he also mentioned sec. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure as well in the application, but that will not derogate from the true character of the application. IN my view, therefore, such an application does not fall under Art. 11 (g) of the Second Schedule of the Act and consequently the application cannot be said to be one which is specifically provided for and will naturally fall under the residuary Article for applications under Art. 19 (s) of the Act. Under the last mentioned Article court-fees stamp of Rs. 2/- only is required which the petitioner has already affixed on the application and this is, therefore, sufficient. For these reasons I over-rule the office report and hold that the stay application filed by the petitioner is sufficiently stamped. .;

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