JHALAWAR TRANSPORT SERVICE LTD Vs. TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
LAWS(RAJ)-1967-3-4
HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
Decided on March 29,1967

JHALAWAR TRANSPORT SERVICE LTD Appellant
VERSUS
TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL Respondents

JUDGEMENT

JAGAT NARAYAN, J. - (1.) THIS is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution by M/s. Jhalawar Transport Service Ltd. , Jhalawar, against an order of the Transport Appellate Tribunal dated 21-1-67 refusing to suspend the operation of the permit of Umar Daraz respondent on the ground that it had no power to do so. The petition has been contested on behalf of Umar Daraz.
(2.) THE petitioner is an existing operator on the Jhalawar-Pirawa route. Umar Daraz respondent No. 3 applied for the grant of a permit on this route. This application was opposed by the petitioner. Some other persons also applied including Sharma Transport. THEir application was opposed by the petitioner. According to the allegation of the petitioner the Regional Transport Authority orally announced at its meeting on 10th 11th January, 1967 that they had granted a permit to respondent No. 3 on the Jhalawar-Pirawa route although the consideration of his application was not on the agenda of the Regional Transport Authority for that meeting. THE Secretary issued a permit to respondent No. 3 on the next day even though he did not have a vehicle of the appropriate model prescribed by the State Transport Authority in his possession. THE resolution of the Regional Transport Authority granting a permit to respondent No. 3 has not been published as yet. THE petitioner filed an appeal before the Transport Appellate Tribunal against the grant of permit, on the basis of his affidavit that such grant was orally announced by the Regional Transport Authority. It also moved the appellate authority to suspend the operation of the permit to respondent No. 3. This application was rejected by the Tribunal on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to suspend the operation of the permit to respondent No. 3. In doing so it relied on the decision of a learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court in Ramkrishnan vs. S. T. Appellate Tribunal (1 ). The learned Judge of the Kerala High Court held that an express power to stay the order of the Regional Transport Authority pending appeal had been conferred under sec. 134 (1), but the permit having been issued nothing more remained to be done by the Regional Transport Authority which it could stay. He was of the opinion that the power of stay will be deemed to be inherent in the appellate authority as was held in Themmalapuram Bus Transport Ltd. vs. Regional Transport Officer (2), but a power to issue an injunction restraining the person to whom a permit has been issued from plying his bus on the route cannot be deemed to be inherent. On behalf of respondent No. 3 it was contended that only a court has inherent power, but a quasi-judicial tribunal has no inherent power. This contention is without force. In Shivji Singh vs. The State Transport Authority Jaipur and Mubarak Hussain (D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 68/65 decided on 8-5-56) it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that the State Transport Authority, which was the appellate authority at that time under the Motor Vehicles Act, had inherent power to pass a stay order. At that time there was no provision in the Motor Vehicles Act conferring an express power on the appellate tribunal to pass a stay order. Sec. 134 was added by the Amending Act of 1956. The question which therefore arises for determination in this case is whether this inherent power in an appropriate case extends to the passing of a temporary order of injunction. Courts have inherent powers to make necessary orders for the ends of justice and to prevent the abuse of the process of the court. I do not see why the character of the inherent power of quasi-judicial tribunals should be different. In Manohar Lal vs. Seth Hiralal (3) it was held that in the exercise of its inherent power a civil court can pass an order of injunction not covered by order 39. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable to appellate tribunals under the Motor Vehicles Act. But if the exercise of inherent power to issue a temporary injunction is necessary for the ends of justice in a particular case then there is no reason why a quasi-judicial tribunal should not exercise it. The inherent powers are however to be exercised judiciously in appropriate cases only. I accordingly hold that the Transport Appellate Tribunal was in error in thinking that it had no power to suspend the operation of the permit issued to respondent No. 3. I accordingly allow the writ petition as indicated above and quash the order of the Transport Appellate Tribunal rejecting the stay application filed by the petitioner before it. In the circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs of this writ petition. .;


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