(1.) THE circumstances under which this second appeal against the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority dated 13. 10. 1965 has been filed are as follows. Narpat Singh, plaintiff respondent brought a suit for declaration and possession against the appellant defendant. THE averment in the plaint was that during his minority his mother entrusted the management of the land in dispute to the appellant who took undue advantage of the situation and got himself entered as khatedar tenant in the settlement record. THE suit was resisted by the appellant on the ground that he had acquired khatedari rights. THE trial court framed four issues and decreed the suit on 28. 2. 1961. An appeal was filed before the Revenue Appellate Authority, as a result of which, the case was remanded on the 16th March, 1962, after setting aside the decree with the direction that a new issue be framed, whether the plaintiff was entitled to be declared khatedar of the portion of the well and the land in dispute, both the parties be asked to adduce fresh evidence on the same and fresh orders passed in accordance with the law. THE trial court after framing the fresh issue and taking fresh evidence of as many as five additional witnesses, again decreed the suit. An appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority met with on success, and hence this second appeal before us.
(2.) WE have heard the counsel for the parties and also gone through the record. The learned counsel for the appellant has attacked the judgment of the trial court as well as the appellate court on the ground that both were not judgments in law. The procedure adopted by the trial court was absolutely unwarranted and could not stand scrutiny. WE have carefully gone through the judgment of the trial court. The learned trial court did not discuss the evidence either already on record or produced after the remand with regard to issues No. 2 and 3. which had already been framed and which had been disposed of in his previous judgment. He only stated that he is in agreement with the decision given with regard to issues Nos. 1. 2 and 3, and proceeded thereafter to discuss the additional issue No. 4 in detail. WE have no hesitation in agreeing with the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned trial court committed a material irregularity in not discussing the issues Nos. 1, 2 and 3. When the previous judgment was set aside by the appellate court, that became a nullity in law, and the learned trial court was obliged to apply his mind afresh on the determination of issues No. 1, 2 and 3. It cannot be said that the additional evidence produced had no bearing on these three issues. The learned trial court has not even stated this. As laid down in O. 20, Rule 4 a judgment must contain (a) a concise statement of the case, (b) the points for determination, (c) the decision thereon, and (d) the reasons for such decision It is not enough to say that a court passing a judgment agreed with the previous finding by his predecessor. A judgment should demonstrably indicate that the court passing a judgment has applied his mind. As has often been repeated, justice should not only be done but should appear to have been done. Where a judgment does not on the face of it indicate that the trial court had independently applied his mind to the points at issue, it is not a proper judgment. This type of judicial pronouncements do not inspire confidence.