- (1.)THIS is an application in revision against the order of the learned Sessions Judge, Ajmer dated 10th December, 1964 and arises under the following circumstences.
(2.)ON the application of one Devilal the District Magistrate, Ajmer purporting to act under sec. 23 (5) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter called the Act) sanctioned the prosecution of the petitioner on the ground that he had accepted rent of the leased premises at a rate higher than fixed by the court. The petitioner filed an appeal against the said order in the court of the Sessions Judge, Ajmer. A preliminary objection was raised before the Sessions Judge, that no appeal lay against the order of the District Magistrate passed under sec. 23 (5) of the Act. The learned Sessions Judge, upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the appeal. It is against this order that the present revision application has been filed and it is contended on behalf of the petitioner that all orders including one under sec. 23 (5) passed under the Act are appealable as provided in sec. 22 (1) of the Act, and therefore, the view taken by the Sessions Judge is erroneous. This is the sole ground urged in the revision application.
It is well-known that the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act was enacted to protect the tenants against eviction on flimsy grounds and prevent the landlords from charging exorbitant rents. Various provisions have been made in the Act to achieve this object. The Act also provides the forum where both landlord and tenant can seek redress of their grievances. Under sec. 6 of the Act a suit has to be filed in the lowest court of competent jurisdiction for fixation of standard rent for any premises. Under sec. 11 a suit has to be brought by the landlord for increase in rent or standard rent in the lowest court of competent jurisdiction. A suit for eviction under sec. 13 of the Act has also to be filed in the lowest court of competent jurisdiction. Magistrates are also invested with certain powers under sec. 17 of the Act. Sec. 22 contains a provision for appeals and revisions and is as follows : (1) (From every decree or order passed by a Court under this Act, an appeal shall lie to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from original decrees and orders passed by such former court. (2) Second appeal shall lie from any such decree or order. Provided that nothing herein contained shall affect the powers of the High Court for Rajasthan in revision. (3) Any person aggrieved by an order of the (Magistrate) may within fifteen days from the date of such order, appeal 'therefrom to (the District Magistrate or such authority as the (State) Government may from time to time appoint in that behalf. Obviously an order passed by a District Magistrate under sec. 23 (5) cannot be called a decree. The question is whether it is 'order' within the meaning of sub-sec. 1 of sec. 22.

In my opinion the orders which are appealable under sub-sec. 1 of sec. 22 are only those orders which are passed by Civil Courts under this Act. A reading of sub-sec. 2 makes it quite clear. Both sub-sec. 1 and 2 are inter-connected because sub-sec. 2 says that no second appeal shall lie from any such decree or order. The words "any such decree or order" refer to a decree or order mentioned in sub-sec. 1. It is only in regard to the orders passed by a Civil Court that a question of filing second appeal can arise. Therefore, a combined reading of sub-sec. 1 and 2 shows beyond any manner of doubt that orders passed by a District Magistrate under sub-sec. 5 of sec. 23 are not appealable under sec. 22 (1 ). This view finds further support from the fact that a separate provision under sub-sec. 3 of sec. 22 is made* by the Legislature providing appeals against orders of the Magistrates passed Under the Act that is under sec. 17. If the Legislature had intended to provide any appeal against the order of the District Magistrate, it could have plainly said so in sub-sec. 3 of sec. 22 which provides for appeals against the order of Magistrates. In my view sec. 22 is quite clear and no appeal lies against the order of the District Magistrate passed under sec. 23 (5) of the Act. The learned Sessions Judge was therefore, right in rejecting the appeal filed against the said order.

Learned counsel for the petitioner however, urges that if no appeal is held to lie against the order of the District Magistrate then this Court can exercise its powers under sec. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure because the order is passed by the District Magistrate as 'an inferior criminal' Court. It is urged that the proceeding under sec. 23 (5) is of a criminal nature and the District Magistrate while giving sanction for filing a complaint has to decide whether there has been any contravention of the provisions of the Act or not and as such the District Magistrate acts as a criminal court. Reliance is placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Central Talkies Ltd. Kanpur vs. Dwarka Prasad, (l ). In my view the above case in no authority for the proposition that the District Magistrate purporting to act under sec. 23 (5) of the Act acts as a Court. In that case the main question for determination was whether an Additional District Magistrate, who had been appointed as such under sec. 10 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and had been invested with powers of the District Magistrate, under the Code and other laws was competent to deal with an application under sec. 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act for permission to file a civil suit for eviction or not. Sec. 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act was as under : "no suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation, except on one or more of the foliowing grounds. . . . . . "

The said Act also contained the definition of 'district Magistrate'. The permission for filing a suit for eviction was given in that case by the Additional District Magistrate. In the Supreme Court question was raised that the District Magistrate mentioned in sec. 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act was a persona designate, and that either he or an Officer authorised by him to perform his functions could grant permission. This contention was repelled by the Supreme Court on the ground that the provision of sec. 10 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was a specific provision to the contrary within the meaning of sec. (2) of the Code and therefore, the Additional District Magistrate, must be regarded as possessing the powers of the District Magistrate, under any other law including the U. P. Act 3 of 1947.

In order to determine whether a tribunal is or is not a court one has to look not to the source of the tribunal's authority or any peculiarity in the method of granting permission but to the general character of its powers and activities. In Virindar Kumar Satyawadi vs. The State of Punjab (2), it was observed that : "what distinguishes a court from a quasijudicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declare the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question therefore arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a Court as distinguished from a quasijudicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act, it possesses all the artributes of a Court. "

Keeping these observation in mind it is to be seen whether a District Magistrate acting under sec. 23 (5) of the Act can be said to be a court. It is clear that the powers given to the District Magistrate,, under this section are absolutely untrammelled by the need of any inquiry or other proceeding before an order for sanction of filing a complaint is passed by him. There is absolutely no suggestion that it is necessary for the District Magistrate to issue any notice to the opposite party or to hear him or to hold any inquiry or to have any specified material before him. The law does not make it incumbent upon him to follow any procedure or take any proceeding in the nature of an inquiry before passing an order. The law leaves it entirely to the discretion of the District Magistrate, whether to give sanction for making a complaint or not. It is clear from this provision that the power under sec. 23 (5) of the Act is not given to the District Magistrate, as a presiding Officer of the Court constituted under the Code of Criminal Procedure, but as Special Officer in order that frivolous complaints might not be instituted by private persons. No doubt when power is give to a court constituted under the Code of Criminal Procedure the Court has to act according to a prescribed procedure and has to decide the matter after making some inquiry and hearing both parties But as already stated the power under sec. 23 (5) is not given to the District Magistrate, in his capacity as a court constituted under the Act but as a Special Officer. Therefore, a presumption of following judicial inquiry conducted under the definite rules of procedure which attaches to a court cannot be held to apply to the District Magistrate, acting under sec. 23 (5) of the Act.

I am therefore, of the view the District Magistrate, in granting sanction to the filing of a complaint under sec. 23 (5) of the Act is not an inferior criminal court and any order passed by him in that capacity is not revisable by this Court under sec. 439 of the Code.

This revision application is, therefore, not maintainable and is hereby dismissed. .