HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
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N.M.Kasliwal, J. -
(1.)This criminal revision has been filed by the complainant against an order of the learned Sessions Judge Sikar dated 16th March, 1983 whereby he has discharged the accused persons for offence under Section 307 Indian Penal Code and has sent the case for trial to the learned Magistrate for other offences which are triable by a Magistrate. It is contended by the learned counsel for the complainant that the accused persons inflicted serious and grave injuries on four persons, namely, Bhagwan Ram, Bhagwan Singh, Raju and Pratap and looking to the nature of injuries it was a case clearly made out under 5. 307 Indian Penal Code. It is further submitted that one of the injuries found on Bhagvan Singh, was fracture of the skull bones and this injury clearly showed that the offence was of Section 307 Indian Penal Code. It was also submitted that at the stage of framing charge the court is not required to go into truth, veracity or effect of the evidence meticulously but has only to see whether there was any ground prima facie made out for framing charge against the accused persons. Reliance is placed on State of Maharashtra v. Balram Damu Patil and others1 and State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh2.
(2.)On the other hand, it was contended by Mr. Gupta, learned counsel for the accused persons that the complainant had no right to file a revision against the order discharging the accused persons for offence under Section 307 Indian Penal Code as the case was instituted on a police report. It is further submitted that the learned Sessions Judge has rightly pointed out from the facts and circum stances of the case that no prima facie case for offence under Section 307 Indian Penal Code has been made out on merits. No case of exceptional circumstances was made out so as to call for interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction on a revision filed by the complainant. Reliance is placed on Thakur Ram and others v. The State of Bihar3, I have given my careful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for both the parties and have perused the record.
(3.)So far as the legal proposition whether a complainant can file a revision or not against the order of discharge passed in a case instituted on a police report, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have considered the matter in Chaganti Kotaish and others v. Goginani Venkateshwara Rao and another4. It was a case. of revision filed by a private party against an order of acquittal. It was observed in this. case as under after making a review of the earlier decision of the Supreme Court After a review of the earlier decisions, the extent of the jurisdiction of the High Court in the matter of interfering revision against an order of acquittal has been laid down by this Court in K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh5 as follows: It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal but this jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Sub-section (4) of section 439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that makes it all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial, when it cannot itself directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction. This places limitations on the power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power should be exercised. It is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. We may however indicate some cases of this kind, which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where the trial Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce, on where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial Court to be inadmissible or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature, where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal, and in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of the provisions of Section 139 (4)The above observations leave no manner of doubt that there is not a complete ambargo on a private party to invoke the revisional powers of the High Court against an order of acquittal or discharge. However, this power is to be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been flagrant miscarriage of justice. Taking the above statement of law in consideration in my view no interference is calle3 for by this Court against the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge in the present case. The learned Sessions Judge has taken into consideration the circumstance that the intention of the accused persons was to take forcible possession of the house occupied by Kajod complainant. The intention of the accused persons was not to kill any person but was to like forcible possession of the house occupied by Kajod and for that purpose to inflict injuries on the persons who might come in their way to fulfil this object. It cannot be said that the learned Sessions Judge in taking the above view committed any error of law or procedure. Learned counsel for the complainant Kajod was unable to show that any injury was inflicted on complainant Kajod. It is also clear from the prosecution case that though the accused persons were armed with sharp edged weapons, but no injury dangerous to life is alleged to have been inflicted an anyone of the injured persons by sharp edged weapons. Only one injury on Bhagwan Singh. has been shown to be grievous and the same was also inflicted by a blunt weapon. Even if one injury by a blunt weapon was multiple fracture on the parietal region of Bhagwan Singh it cannot be said, coupled with other facts and circumstances of the else, that it was a case made out under Section 307 Indian Penal Code. Even if two views may be possible in this regard, this court on a revision filed by the complainant cannot interfere as this would not be a case of exceptional circumstance as laid down by the Supreme Court in Chaganti Kotaish and otherss case (supra). So far as the principle laid down in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singhs case (supra) and State of Maharashtra v. Balram Damu Patti and otherss case (supra), is concerned there cannot be any dispute that at the stage of framing charge, the court is not entitled to go into the truth veracity, or effect of the evidence in a meticulous manner. But if on a bare perusal of the entire evidence placed on record and the case brought forward by the prosecution itself, without considering the defence case it is found that prima facie no charge is made out under section 307 Indian Penal Code, then no interference is called by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The learned Sessions Judge has discharged the accused persons taking into consideration the admitted case of the prosecution and this revision being filed by the complainant, no case is made out of such exceptional circumstances so as to call for interference by this Court.
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