STATE OF RAJASTHAN Vs. MANPHOOL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application by the State of Rajasthan under Article 134 (l) (c) of the Constitution for a certificate that the case, with respect to which this application has been made, is fit for appeal to the Supreme Court.

(2.) THE facts are that seven persons were prosecuted for the murder of three others, namely Pat-ram and his wife and Patram's son Brijlal. The motive for the murders was said to be pre-existing enmity between the two sides, and the murders were alleged to be the result of a conspiracy between the seven accused. Two of the deceased Pat-ram and his wife were killed at their house, while the third Brijlal was killed at the field. Thereupon there were two cases in the trial Court with respect to these incidents, which resulted in two appeals to this Court. Both the appeals were allowed, and the accused persons were acquitted. This application is against four out of seven accused who were acquitted. One of these four Manphool was convicted by the Sessions Judge with respect to the murder of Patram and his wife, while the other three were convicted in the other case relating to Brijlal. We have not been able to understand how the State has filed one application for leave to appeal when there were two separate trials in the Sessions Court and two separate appeals in this Court, though this Court disposed of the two appeals by a common judgment. Be that as it may, we have to see whether this is a fit case in which we should grant the certificate prayed for

(3.) WE have gone through the judgment of the Bench of this Court which decided the appeals, and the grounds on which the State wants us to grant the certificate of fitness. It is quite clear from the examination of these two documents that the questions involved in the two appeals were really questions of fact, and the learned Judges held that the evidence of the eye-witnesses was not reliable, and therefore acquitted the accused persons. What the State wants is that we should certify the case as fit for appeal so that the Supreme Court may review the entire evidence and come to its own con-elusions as to whether the view of this Court that the witnesses were not reliable is correct or not. Learned Advocate-General has placed reliance on - Pritam Singh v. State and - Habib Mohammed v. Hyderabad State AIR 1951 Hyd 71 (B ). His contention is that in granting leave, under Article 134 (1) (c), we should be guided by the same considerations which have been laid down by the Supreme Court in - Pritam Singh's case (A)', and he paraphrases these considerations to mean that if we are of the view that the Supreme Court is likely to interfere with the judgment of this Court, we should grant leave. We must say that we cannot agree with this contention of the learned Advocate-General. In the first place, the considerations which apply to the granting of special leave by the Supreme Court under Article 136 are, in our opinion, different from the considerations which apply to the High Court granting leave under Article 134 (l) (c ). Article 136 is a kind of residuary Article giving power to the Supreme Court, notwithstanding anything in Chapter IV of Part V of the Constitution, to grant special leave to appeal in its discretion from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any Court or Tribunal in the territory of India. Article 134 (l) (c), which applies to criminal matters, is exactly in the same terms as Article 133 (l) (c) which applies to civil matters, and we think that similar principles should apply to the grant of a certificate by the High Court under Article 134 (l) (c) which apply to the grant of a certificate under Article 133 (l) (c ). We must, therefore, respectfully express our dissent from the view taken in - Habib Mohammed's case (B)' that the principles in connection with the grant of special leave to appeal to Supreme Court in criminal cases laid down in - Pritam Singh's, case (A)' are useful as furnishing a sound basis in the matter' of granting a certificate of fitness under Article 134 (l) (c) in the absence of any rules under Article 145.