Decided on November 26,1952

GAYALAL Appellant


Sharma, J. - (1.)THIS is an application by one Gayalal landlord under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Board of Revenue dated 17th November, 1952.
(2.)AN application was made under sec. 7 of the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bayana, by the opposite party No. 2, Girraj, against the petitioner, Gayalal, for his reinstatement to one-fourth part of plots Nos. 426, 427, 429, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 478, 484 in village Singhara. The allegations were that he was dispossessed by Gayalal within three months from the date of application. Gayalal's defence was that Girraj had voluntarily surrendered the land, and executed necessary relinquishment deed. He was, therefore, not entitled to protection under the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance. This contention was repelled by the Sub-Divisional Officer, and it was found that the tenant Girraj was entitled to be reinstated. Against this order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, the landlord Gayalal went in revision under sec. 10 of the Tenants Protection Ordinance to the Rajasthan Board of Revenue, but the Board of Revenue dismissed the application for revision, and affirmed the order of the first court so far as Girraj was concerned.
Dissatisfied with that order, this application under Art. 226 has been made by Gayalal. The only point that has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that two applications were made under sec. 7 of the Tenants Protection Ordinance against the petitioner Gayalal, one by Bhikha and the other by Girraj. In both the cases, the defence of Gayalal was that both the tenants had surrendered their holdings and had executed relinquishment deeds. In Bhikha's case relinquishment deed was held proved and binding and his application was dismissed. The Board of Revenue, therefore, erred in law in disbelieving the relinquishment by Girraj. The finding, which has been given by the Revenue Board on this point, is entirely a finding of fact. The principles under which an application for writ under Art. 226 lies have been enunciated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of G. Veerappa Pillai, proprietor, Sathi Vilas Bus Service, Porayar, Tanjore District, Madras vs. Raman and Raman Ltd. , Kumbakonam, Tanjore District, and others (1) (1952 S. C. J. 261. ). It has been held that - "such writs as are referred to in Art. 226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, ommission, error, or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. " None of such things is found in the present case. As has been observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the said case, "however extensive the jurisdiction may be it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decisions impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made. " It is quite within the province of the revenue courts to believe or not to believe the evidence, which was produced before them. It is not the business of this Court in an application under Art. 226 to go into this question.

The application has no force, and is dismissed. .

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