- (1.)THIS is an application under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the order of the Civil Judge of Pali, and has arisen in the following circumstances:
(2.)THE applicant Tejraj brought a suit for a sum of Rs. 3,687/- in the court of the Civil Judge, Pali. That suit was dismissed for default on the 9th March, 1951. An application for restoration was made on the 28th March, 1951. Notice was issued on this application, but when it came up for hearing on the 25th April, 1951, it was again dismissed for default. THEreupon, a fresh application was made the same day for restoring the restoration application. This second application came up for hearing on the 12th May, 1951. On that day, the applicant and his counsel were again absent, and the second application was dismissed for default. THEn on the 14th May, 1951, a third restoration application was made on behalf of the applicant. This application came up for hearing on the 31st May, 1951, and was dismissed by the following order - "mr. Manakmal present. He says that he has not been able to find any ruling in support of his application. To me it appears that there is no law to support this application, which is, therefore, rejected. "
Learned counsel for the applicant urges that an application like the one made on the 14th May, 1951, lies under sec. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and therefore the Civil Judge, in rejecting that application on the ground that there was no law to support such an application, failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him in law.

Section 151 runs as follows: - "nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. " This section gives no right to a party to make an application under it. It gives the power to the court, if it thinks that the ends of justice require it, or prevention of abuse of the process of the court demands it, to pass such orders as it thinks fit. Strictly speaking, therefore the Civil Judge was right if he meant to say that no party had a right to make an application of the sort which was before him, though the way he expressed it, namely that there was no law in support of such application, is not correct. It is open to a party to bring it to the notice of the court by application that there has been an abuse of the process of the court or that it is necessary in the ends of justice that a particular order should be passed. It will then be for the court to satisfy itself whether it is necessary to pass an order under sec. 151 for either of those two reasons. If it is so satisfied, it will exercise its inherent power under sec. 151, and pass such orders as it thinks fit. All that therefore can be said about the application, which was made in this case by the applicant, is that it brought to the notice of the court that it should exercise its power under sec. 151 in this case.

This brings us to the question whether this was a fit case in which the court should have exercised its powers under sec. 151 either for the ends of justice, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. The facts have already been set out by us, and they show that the applicant has been throughout negligent in this case. He first allowed the suit to be dismissed for default on the 9th March, 1951. Thereafter, there was an application for restoration on the 28th March, 1951. We should have expected a litigant, whose case had been dismissed for default, to be careful thereafter; but we find that the application for restoration was also dismissed for default on the 25th April, 1951. Thereafter, on the same day, an application was made for restoration of the application for restoration. This application itself was in the nature of a motion to the court under sec. 151 for exercise of its powers in the ends of justice. As the application was made on the very day on which the dismissal had taken place, the court thought it fit to entertain it in its inherent jurisdiction. This was in accordance with our decision in Abhey Singh vs. State (1) (1951 R. L. W. 44. ). We should have expected even greater vigilance in connection with this second application of the 25th April, 1951; but we find that there was again negligence on the part of the applicant, and it had also to be dismissed for default on the 12th May, 1951. Then followed the present application on the 14th May, 1951. By this application the applicant again brought to the notice of the court that it should exercise its powers under sec. 151, and restore his petition dated 25th April, 1951. We think that there is a limit to which the negligence of a party can be condoned by the court in its inherent power under sec. 151. The court had already entertained one application under sec. 151 on the 25th April, 1952; but the party was again negligent and allowed that application to be dismissed for default. We think, under the circumstances, that if the court in effect refused to exercise its powers under sec. 151, we cannot say that it was in any way acting improperly. As a matter of fact, successive applications like this bringing to the notice of the court that it should exercise its powers under sec. 151 would amount to an abuse of the process of the court, and a party, who allows one application after another to be dismissed like this cannot expect the court to assist him by exercising its powers under sec. 151. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere in this case.

The revision is hereby dismissed with costs to the opposite party. .