GULLA Vs. DOLIYA
LAWS(RAJ)-1952-4-13
HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
Decided on April 18,1952

GULLA Appellant
VERSUS
DOLIYA Respondents


Referred Judgements :-

PARMESHRI UPADHIA VS. KRISHNA KUMAR LAL [REFERRED TO]
(LALA) DAU DAYAL VS. RAM PRASAD [REFERRED TO]
SHYAM LAL VS. HIRA NATH CHELA [REFERRED TO]



Cited Judgements :-

ROOP SINGH VS. JUNJAR SINGH [LAWS(RAJ)-1956-8-6] [REFERRED TO]
HARDAYAL VS. JAGGASINGH [LAWS(RAJ)-1968-4-10] [REFERRED TO]
MANRAJ VS. RAMESHWAR [LAWS(RAJ)-1969-1-29] [REFERRED TO]
BADRILAL VS. MODA [LAWS(RAJ)-1979-1-2] [REFERRED TO]


JUDGEMENT

- (1.)THIS is a reference by the Assistant Collector of Sojat under sec. 40 (2) of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act No. I of 1951, and has arisen in the following circumstances.
(2.)A suit was pending in the court of Munsif Sojat, who transferred it to the Assistant Collector under sec. 6 of Act I of 1951, holding that the suit was cognisable by the revenue court. The order sheet shows that the Munsif was of opinion that the suit was covered by items 2 and 9 of Group B of the First Schedule. When the case came to the Assistant Collector, he took the view that the civil court had jurisdiction. Therefore he has made this reference under sec. 40 (2), though in his letter the Assistant Collector says that the reference is under sec. 40 (1) of the Act.
The point raised in this reference is whether the jurisdiction is in the civil court or in the revenue court in a case where the relief claimed is partly within the jurisdiction of a civil court and partly within the jurisdiction of a revenue court.

The plaintiff in this case filed the suit before the Munsif, and prayed that the plaintiff's half share in the northern Persian wheel attached to the well named Pipalia in village Dhundla be declared. He further prayed that Kharias No. 11 to 18 be declared as already divided, and that it be further declared that Nos. 11 to 16 out of them are the plaintiff's. He also prayed that certain lands No. 1 to 10 and 19, which were joint be; divided, and the plaintiff's one-fourth share in them be actually demarcated. The reliefs could be granted to the plaintiffs in a suit which would be covered by items 2 and 13 of Group B of Schedule I of Act I of 1951.

In addition to these reliefs the plaintiff further prayed for certain reliefs with respect to his rights of irrigation from the well, and also prayed for a permanent injunction against three of the defendants. He also prayed for a decree for damages for Rs. 500/- against defendants 1 to 7. Besides these seven defendants, seven other defendants Nos. 8 to 14 were impleaded in the suit, though these defendants had nothing to do with the right to the well.

It seems to me that the suit, as it is framed, suffers from the defect of misjoinder of persons and causes of action, and it is necessary when the suit goes back to the trial court to have this matter cleared up. But the question, which has been referred, is as to what should be done in a suit in which part of the reliefs can be granted by the civil court and part by the revenue court.

A reference in this connection may be made to sec. 7 (2) of Act I of 1951, which reads as follows: - "no court other than a revenue court shall take cognizance of any such suit or application, or of any suit or application based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application. Explanation - If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief might be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil court is greater than, or additional to, or is not identical with, that which the revenue court could have granted. I have already mentioned that the first relief in this case could be granted by the revenue court under items 2 and 13 of Group B of the First Schedule. The other relief that the 'plaintiff claims in respect of his right of irrigation would really follow from the declaration of his right in the well and need not have been specifically asked for; In any case, it is additional to the relief which can be granted by the Revenue Court, and follows from that relief, and the explanation to sec. 7 (2) shows that the mere prayer of an additional relief will not take the suit out of cognizance of the revenue court.

Further the plaintiff has asked for a permanent injunction against three of the defendants Nos. 8, 13 and 14, who are supposed to be trying to take unlawful possession over the well. It is difficult to see how this relief against three other persons can be joined in a suit for a declaration of his rights to the well, and the land attached to it against his co-sharers. The Assistant Collector thinks that it is not possible for the revenue court to give a permanent injunction, and therefore the suit is triable only by the civil court. Here again, however, if one looks to the explanation to sec. 7 (2), one will come to the conclusion that if the revenue court can grant some relief, the fact that something in addition to that relief is being asked would not make the suit triable by the civil court.

A similar provision exists in the U. P. Tenancy Act of 1939 in sec. 242, but there is marked difference in the explanation. In the U. P. Act, the first explanation reserves the jurisdiction of the revenue court where the relief asked for from the civil court is not identical with that which the revenue court could have granted. The second explanation in the U. P. Act is about a suit under sec. 180, and in that connection it is provided that it is immaterial that the relief which may be asked for from the civil court is greater than, or additional to, that which the revenue court could have granted. But in the Rajasthan Act there is only one explanation which combines both the explanations of the U. P. Act, and in every case where relief can be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil court is greater than or additional to, or is not identical with, that which the revenue court could have granted. Thus the reservation of the jurisdiction of the revenue court, which was made in the U. P. Act only with respect to one section has been extended in the Rajasthan Act to all the proceedings under the Act, and all that matters is that the cause of action is one in respect of some relief might be granted by the revenue court. In that case it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil court is greater than, or additional to, or is not identical with that which the revenue court could have granted. Therefore once the cause of action is such that a suit can be brought in the revenue court on the basis of it and some relief obtained, the suit must be filed in the revenue court even though it may be possible to ask for greater or additional or some different relief from the civil court. Thus the Rajasthan Act is more strongly in favour of the jurisdiction of the revenue court than is the case with the U. P. Act, and where therefore a case comes under one of the items in the Schedules to the Rajasthan Act, and is based on a cause of action arising under any of these items, the suit must be filed in the revenue court. It is immaterial whether by filing the suit in the civil court, the plaintiff might be able to ask for a relief greater than, or additional to, or not identical with that which the revenue court could have granted. He has to file the suit in the revenue court in view of this explanation, ' and, of course, if he asks for something which the revenue court is not in a position to give him, the revenue court will only give him that relief which could be granted to him under the provisions of Act I of 1951 read with the various rent and revenue laws of the various covenanting States.

I propose to examine some cases of the Allahabad High Court in this connection. It may be mentioned that the U. P. Tenancy Act of 1939 made one important change in sec. 242, and that was that the word "adequate" which appeared in the corresponding section, namely sec. 230, of the Agra Tenancy Act, did not appear before the word "relief" in sec. 242. Under the Agra Tenancy Act of 1926 the jurisdiction of other courts was barred only when adequate relief could be obtained in the revenue court. Therefore the authorities prior to this change in law were generally in favour of holding that the jurisdiction was in the civil courts because adequate relief could not be obtained in the revenue court. In this connection, reference may be made to Sukhdeo and another vs. Basdeo and others (1) (I. L. R. LVII All. 949.), Dau Dayal vs. Ram Prasad (2) (A. I. R. 1936 All. 741.), and Parmeshri Upadhiya and others vs. Krishna Kumar Lal and Dhani Lohar (3) (IXR. 1944 All. 330. ). The last case, though it is decided after the U. P. Tenancy Act of 1939 came into force, arose under the Agra Tenancy Act of 1926.

These authorities therefore are not of much help, because the absence of the word "adequate" both in sec. 242 of the U. P. Tenancy Act of 1939, and in sec. 7 (2) of the Rajasthan Act, makes a good deal of difference. In the latter Act, the words are "any relief", and thus taken along with the explanation the jurisdiction of the courts of revenue comes in when any relief can be granted by them and it is immaterial that a greater or additional or some different relief can be asked from the civil court.

As for the relief of permanent injunction, on which so much stress has been laid by the Assistant Collector, it is enough to say that this relief is about the future. I do not see why the plaintiff should suppose from the very beginning that even after he gets his rights declared by the revenue court and gets the land partitioned by metes and bounds, his co-sharers will continue to harass him in spite of the revenue court's decree. After he gets the revenue court's decree, he should act accordingly, and if his co-sharers still trouble him, he can always ask for a permanent injunction from the civil court on the basis of the revenue court's decree. Reference in this connection may be made to Shyam Lal vs. Hira Nath Chela (4) (AIR. 1943a11. 685. ). It was held in that case that if adequate relief can be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil courts is not identical with that which the revenue court could have granted and that if a suit be in its essence cognizable by a revenue court, the addition of a prayer for injunction will not take the case out of the cognizance of that court. It seems to me that the principle laid down in this case is applicable in Rajasthan with even greater force and where any relief can be obtained from the revenue court, the addition of a prayer for permanent injunction will not oust the jurisdiction of the revenue court.

Taking the plaint in this case therefore as a whole, it seems to me that the main prayer of the plaintiff is that his rights in the well may be declared and his one-fourth share in certain lands attached to the well may be divided by metes and bounds. These are the essential reliefs in the plaint, and come under items 2 and 13 of Group B of the First Schedule. The other reliefs are merely ancillary to these main reliefs, and, in view of the explanation to sec. 7 (2), the jurisdiction of the revenue court would not be ousted, even though a greater relief could be asked for from the civil court, or additional reliefs could be obtained from the civil court, or the relief which the revenue court could give is not quite identical with the relief which the civil court might be able to give.

(3.)I am, therefore, of opinion that the main relief in this case being obtainable from the revenue court, the suit lies in the revenue court, and the Assistant Collector is competent to determine it, leaving out those ancillary reliefs about which he cannot grant relief undetermined.
The reference is rejected. I therefore order the Assistant Collector to proceed with the suit in the manner indicated above. .



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