(1.) THIS is a Civil Second Appeal against the judgement of the learned Additional District-Judge No. 4, Jaipur City, dated 23. 8. 68 reversing the judgment and decree dated 22. 8. 66 of the learned Addi-tional Civil Judge, Jaipur City, in Civil Suit No. 295/63.
(2.) TO properly appreciate the points involved in this appeal, the facts may be set out.
(3.) THE learned Additional District Judge has held that the suspension of Sunderlal was in exercise of the inherent powers and not under rules, and, therefore, it was not a mere suspension in contemplation of a criminal prosecution. In his opinion, therefore, such a suspension order will not come to an end even on acquittal of the Government Servant and will continue till the departmentalenq-uiry concludes. In September 1954, when Sunderlal was suspended, the Rajasthan Civil-Service (Classification Control and Appeal Rules), 1950 (here inafter referred to as the Rules) were in force. THEre was no provision for suspension -fa Government Servant in connection with a criminal charge. Under rule 15 (v) of the Rules, suspension was also one of the penalties to be imposed on misconduct, but under Explanation 5 to Rule 15 suspension pending enquiry was not considered to be a punishment. THErefore, the rules did contemplate suspension of a Government Servant pending enquiry. Apart from the rules, an employer has inherent powers to suspend its employee in case there is a criminal charge agsinst the employee, or in case a departmental enquiry in accordance with the rules for his misconduct is envisaged against him. THErefore, it is to be seen whether the suspension of Sunderlal was in connection with a criminal charge or in contemplation of a departmental enquiry. Ex. 1, the suspension order dated 13. 9. 54 is to the following effect: - "as Shri Sunder Lal, Cashier and Kappor Chand Amin of the office of the Settlement Officer, Sikar are involved in the case of embezzlement of Rs, 3775/15/3 both are suspended from today, i. e. 10-9-54 afternoon. THE Settlement Officer, Sikar should propose some suitable clerk of his office to work as cashier. " 6. A very perusal of the above order will make it clear that it was not in contemplation of any departmental enquiry against Sunderlal, but because he was involved in a case of embezzlement that he had been suspended. THEre can be no dispute and the position of law can be said to be settled that if an employee is only suspended because of a criminal charge pending investigation and trial, then if such Government Servant is ultimately acquitted, then the order of suspension will case to an end. In case, thereafter the Disciplinary Authority thinks that a departmental enquiry under the rules is still necessary against the Government Servant for his alleged misconduct then fresh orders of suspension are to be passed. Any how, as both the prosecution and departmental enquiry can take place simultaneously, if a Government Servant is suspended on both the counts, that disciplinary proceeding is contemplated or is pending and a case against him in respect of any criminal offence, is under investigation or trial, then the snspension order will not come to an end on mere acquittal and will subsist till the Government Servant is exonerated in the departmental enquiry also. As said above, a perusal of the order (Ex. l) will make it clear that Sunderlal was not suspended in contemplation of any departmental enquiry, but was suspended because of the criminal offence of embezzlement allegedly committed by him and was under investigation. It may also be stated here that the departmental enquiry was only initiated against Sunderlal & in the year 1960 when he had been acquitted a few years earlier. THErefore, in the instant case, when he was acquitted of the charge levelled against him under Section 409, IPC, even the Disciplinary Authority did not contemplate taking departmental action against him. THErefore, on the acquittal of Sunderlal, of the charge levelled against him, the suspension order came to an end and did not subsist when departmental proceedings were initiated against him under the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1958), which had come into force when the departmental proceedings were initiated. In Upendra Nath Barik vs. Orissa Electricity Board (1) it has been observed by the Orissa High Court that suspension under rule 12 (b) of the Orissa Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1962 pending criminal investigation or trial is an interlocutory action, and it remains in force until the final disposal of the criminal proceedings. THE order of suspension automatically ceases to be operative as soon as criminal proceedings are terminated by acquittal or discharge. Immediately after such acquittal or discharge in a criminal case, the delinquent should be deemed to have been reinstated and is accordingly entitled to recover his full pay and allowances since the day of suspension while holding so reliance was placed on R. P. Kapur vs. Union of India (2) and H. L. Mehra vs. Union of India (3 ). It has further been held that even where the conviction has been set aside in appeal and the intermediate order of dismissal is withdrawn, the previous suspension is not revived by starting of a departmental proceeding against a Government Servant. A fresh suspension order would be necessary. In Abdul Rashid Khan vs. Director Laboratories and Museums, Srinagar (4) the learned Judge of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court has also taken a similar view. 7. THErefore, the view of the learned Additional District Judge that because the order of suspension (Ex. 1) was passed in the exercise of inherent powers of the employer, it will subsist even after the acquittal of the Government Servant and will enure for the disciplinary proceedings in the facts and circumstances of this case cannot be said to be correct. As already observed above, a very perusal of the order (Ex. 1) will make it clear that it was not in contemplation of any departmental enquiry but was because of a criminal charge, and, therefore, when the employer only suspended Sunderlal because of the investigation and trial of a criminal case, the suspension order came to an end with the order of acquittal of Sunderlal. If the Disciplinary Authority wanted to initiate departmental enquiry under the Rules of 1958 after the acquittal of Sunderlal, it was necessary to have passed a fresh suspension order, and the start of departmental enquiry in the year 1960 does not revive the suspension order (Ex. 1 ).