DAVE, J. - (1.)THIS is a writ application by Shri Deo Dutt Sharma, Chairman Municipal Council, Ajmer, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
(2.)IT is common ground between the parties that the petitioner took charge of his office of Chairman on 25. 4. 59. In October, 1959, a few members of the Municipal Council signed a motion of no-confidence and presented it in the office of the Collector, Ajmer, who was appointed by the State of Rajasthan as the prescribed authority to whom a motion of no-confidence could be submitted. Thereupon, he convened a meeting for the consideration of the said motion on 27. 11. 59. On the next day, i. e. , 28. 11. 59, he issued a memo informing the Municipal council that the petitioner should be deemed to have vacated his office with effect from 27. 11. 59. The validity of this order was challenged by the petitioner by Writ Application No. 459 of 1959 before this Court. That application was decided op 13. 4. 60. IT was found by this Court that 3 out of 18 members who had voted against the petitioner on 27. 11. 59 were suffering from disqualification on that date and therefore their votes were not valid. Hence, it was declared that the resolution dated 27. 11. 59 regarding want of confidence in the petitioner was not passed by the valid votes of a majority of the whole number of (32) members and therefore the petitioner should not be deemed to have vacated his office. After the said decision of this Court dated 13. 4. 60, the petitioner resumed the office of Chairman. On 3. 8. 60, 15 members of the Municipal Council again submitted a written notice to the prescribed authority (Collector, Ajmer) expressing their intention to make a motion of no-confidence in the petitioner. The prescribed authority, therefore, fixed 1st September, 1960, as the date for the consideration of the said motion at the municipal office, Ajmer, at 11 A. M.
The petitioner's case is that as soon as he came to know about the written notice given by non-petitioners Nos. 2 to 16, he made a representation to non-petitioner No. 1 requesting him not to accept the motion, since it offended against the provisions of sec. 72 (9) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act No. 38 of 1959 (which will hereinafter be referred as the Act), but his request was turned down and the meeting was fixed on 1. 9. 60. It is urged by him that according to sec. 72 (9) of the Act, the notice of motion of no-confidence against him could not be received until the expiry of the period of 6 months from 13th April, 1960, when it was held by this Court that the previous motion of no-confidence was not carried by a majority on 27. 11. 59 and therefore respondent No. 1 had committed an illegality in entertaining the said notice for a motion of no-confidence. It is prayed by him that the opposite party should be restrained by a writ of prohibition or direction from holding a meeting and considering the motion of no-confidence for a period of 6 months commending from 13. 4. 60.

The application is contested by the Government Advocate on behalf of respondent No. 1 and by Shri V. P. Tyagi on behalf of respondents Nos. 6, 13, 15 and 16. It is urged by them that sec. 72 (9) of the Act only lays down that if a motion of no-confidence is not carried out by a majority on the date of the meeting which is held for that purpose, a subsequent motion of no-confidence in the same chairman will not be received until the expiry of a period of 6 months from the date of that meeting, that in the present case the period of 6 months expired on 26. 5. 60 from the date of last meeting, i. e. , 27. 11. 59) that the second notice was given by the respondents on 3. 1. 60, and therefore there was no Violation of the said provision of law -. According to them, the period of 6 months should be computed from 27. 11. 59 and not from 13. 4. 60, as asserted by the petitioner and therefore it is prayed that the application should be dismissed.

The question for determination in this case is whether the period of 6 months prescribed by sec. 72 (9) of the Act should be computed from 27. 11. 59 or 13. 4. 60.

The question set out above apparently looks very simple but its reply is not free from difficulty. Before examining the arguments which have been advanced by both the sides, it would be proper to produce here sec. 72 (9) of the Act, because the decision of the above noted question rests upon its interpretation. It runs as follows: - "72 (9 ). If the motion is not carried by a majority specified in sub-section (9) of sec. 65 or if any meeting cannot be held for want of a quorum, no notice of any subsequent motion of noconfidence in the same chairman shall be received until the expiry of a period of six months from the date of the meeting. "

It is contended by petitioner's learned counsel that although the words used in the said sub-section are "the expiry of the period of six months from the date of the meeting and although the last meeting was actually held on 27. 11. 59, its correct result was announced on 13. 4. 60 when this Court decided the writ application, since it was on the later date that it became clear that the motion of no-confidence was not carried out by the majority of members. According to him, the period of the meet-tig continued from 27. 11. 59 to 13. 4. 60 and so the period should be computed from the later date. It is urged that the petitioner had ceased 10 function as chairman from 27. 11. 59 and he resumed his office after the decision of this Court on 13. 4. 60. He was therefore entitled to have a respite for six months from this date (13. 4. 60) and if the period is computed from 27. 11. 59, the entire purpose of the law would be defeated. In support of his contention, learned counsel has referred to Holmes Vs. Keyes (Lord) (1 ). In that case, an action was brought by two of the directors of a company called Gordon Hotels, Ltd. , for a declaration that Lord Keyes and Mr. Ashe Lincoln had vacated their offices as directors of the company. The question for determination was whether the defendants had acquired their qualification within the period of 2 months from their appointment. Under the company's Articles of Association the qualification of a director was that he should hold in his own right 500 ordinary shares of the company, and therefore he would vacate his office if he did not acquire the number of shares required to qualify him for the office within two months after appointment. At a general meeting of the company held on Dec. 23, 1957, resolutions were presented that K&l (Defendants) be appointed directors. But before the show of hands took place, a poll was demanded in respect of the said resolutions and therefore there was no show of hands. The voting took place on Dec. 23, but the counting could not be made until the following day. On that day, i. e. Dec. 24, the company was informed by the scrutineers that K&l were duly elected. By that time they were not holding sufficient shares to qualify them as directors, but they purchased their qualification shares subsequently. Their names, however, were not entered in the register of shareholders in respect of the shares newly purchased till Feb. 24, 1958. It was held that there was no appointment of K&l for the purpose of sec. 182 of the Companies Act, 1948 or Art. 98 (c) of the Articles of Association until the result of poll was ascertained, viz. , Dec. 24, 1957, and the offices of K. and L. as directors were therefore not vacated on account of their failure to acquire their qualification shares, because the shares were acquired by them on Feb. 24, 1958, i. e. , within the period of 2 months. Learned counsel for the petitioner has laid stress on the following observations made in case (1) by Jenkins L. J. : - "the true view, as the two individual defendants would have it, is, as I understand it, in effect that the meeting should be treated as notionally continuing until the result of the poll is ascertained and that the appointment of the director concerned takes effect as from the date of such ascertainment. Some support for that view is, I think, to be found in Shaw vs. Tati Concessions Ltd. (1913)1 Ch. 292) and Spiller vs. Mayo (1926) W. N. 78), to which I have also ready referred''. It may be pointed that the case cited above is of no help to the petitioner in the circumstances of the instant case. It is true that in the aforesaid case the meeting of December 23, 1957, was treated as notionally continuing, till the following day, i. e. , December 24, 1957, but that was because the result of the poll was declared on December 24, 1957. On December 23, only resolutions were presented and because a poll was demanded, the matter was not decided by the show of hands. The voting no doubt took place on December 23, but the counting commenced on the next day and so long as the result of the poll was not declared, the mere fact that the meeting commenced on December 23, or that the voting took place on that date, could not justify the view that the appointment of the defendants took place on December 23. The defendants could not possibly be held to have been duly elected so long as the result of the poll was not declared and it was for that reason that the period of their appointment was counted from December 24 and not December 23. This is clear from the following observation of the learned Judge: - "in my judgment, the ascertainment of the result should be considered as part of the poll, and, consequently, there can be no appointment of a director by a general meeting until the result of the poll is ascertained. It is only then that the appointment can become in any sense effective. " In the present case, the meeting admittedly took place on 27. 11. 59 and it was known on that very day that 18 out of the total number of 32 elected members of the Municipal Council voted against the petitioner. The formal order informing the Municipal Council that the chairman should be deemed to have vacated his office with effect from 3 P. M. on 27. 11. 59 was passed by the 'prescribed authority' on the next day. If this order were not challenged by the writ application referred above; it would have remained final. At any rate, the meet-ing in fact and in law came to a close after the result of that meeting was declared to the effect that the motion was carried out. In my opinion, that meeting cannot be taken to be notionally continuing till 13. 4. 60 without introducing a legal fiction of a fantastic magnitude for which I see no good justification. It cannot be denied that in fact there was no meeting of the Municipal Council on 13. 4. 60. On that date, this Court, had only declared that the motion of no-confidence should not be taken to have been carried out on 27. 11. 59, because three members, who had voted against the petitioner, were suffering from disqualification and if their invalid votes were rejected, the resolution could not be taken to have been passed by the majority of the total number of members of that body. The effect of this decision was that the motion of no-confidence was deemed not to have been carried out on 27. 11. 59. The date of the meeting nevertheless remained the same i. e. 27. 11. 59 and the period of 6 months under sec. 72 (9) of the Act should be computed from that date and not from 13. 4. 60.

Learned counsel has also referred to Shaw Vs. Tati Concessions Ltd. (2 ). It was also a case in which a poll which was demanded at a company's meeting was directed to be taken on a subsequent date and it was held that the original meeting continued for the purpose of the poll. This case was cited in Holmes' case (2 ). The remarks which have been made above for distinguishing the present case from Holmes' case (1) equally apply to this case (2) and need not He repeated. Learned counsel has also referred to Jackson vs. Hamlyn (3) and M. K. Srinivasan vs. W. S. Subrahmanya Ayyar (4) These cases are of the same nature as those referred above and they do not carry the case of the petitioner any further.

Learned counsel has next referred to the following observation made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Darshan Singh Balwant Singh vs. The State of Punjab (5)? - ''it is a cardinal rule of interpretation that the language used by the Legislature is the true depository of the legislative intent, and that words and phrases occurring in a statute are to be taken not in an isolated or detached manner dissociated from the context, but are to be read together and construed in the light of the purpose and object of the Act itself. " It is contended by learned counsel that the intention of the legislature was that if the motion of no-confidence against a chairman fails on a particular date, another motion of no-confidence against him should not be brought for at least 6 months. It was on 13. 4. 60 that this Court declared that the motion of no-confidence was not carried out against him and therefore 6 months should be computed from that date. If the period is computed from 27. 11. 59, the object of the law would be defeated. I have given due consideration to this argument. The rule of interpretation enunciated by their Lordships in the above observation is very well-known and I am in duty bound to follow it, but the manner in which its application is sought by learned counsel is to my mind, not correct. The dominant object of sec. 72 (9) of the Act, in my opinion, was not to confer upon a chairman a right to continue in office against the wishes of the majority of members, though it enures to his benefit, but to maintain efficient, smooth and harmonious working of the municipal board. If a meeting for a no-confidence motion in the chairman were to be allowed without any restriction, it would have increased the chances of day-to-day frictions and frequent alignments of the members on one side or the other, with the result that the work of the Board would have suffered. It was in order to avoid the frequency of such ugly happenings that the legislature in its wisdom laid down that if a motion for no-confidence in a chairman is defeated at a certain meeting, then a notice for a subsequent motion of no-confidence in the same chairman should not be received until the expiry of a period of 6 months from the date of the meeting. The words "date of the meeting" are explicitly clear and, to my mind, there is nothing in the context or in the general scheme of the law to give them the meaning which is sought to be put by the petitioner. On the other hand, a perusal of secs. 65 and 72 of the Act together shows that the idea of the continuation of the meeting was clearly ruled out by the legislature. Sub-sec. (6) of sec. 72 lays down that as soon as the quorum (of the meeting) is present, the prescribed authority or his nominee should read the motion for the consideration of which the meeting has been convened and declare it to be open for discussion. Sub-sec. (7) then provides that such discussion shall not be adjourned and shall automatically terminate on the expiry of four hours from the time appointed for the commencement of the meeting unless it is concluded earlier. Then, sub-sec. (8) provides that upon the conclusion of the debate or upon the expiry of the period of four hours, as the case may be, the motion shall be put to the vote of the board. This makes it quite clear that the debate on the vote of no-confidence is expressly prohibited by law to extend beyond the period of four hours. If the debate concludes before the expiry of four hours, then the prescribed authority must put the motion to the vote of the board atonce and even if it does not conclude within four hours, the prescribed authority has to bring the debate to a close as soon as the period of four hours expires and then he must put the motion to the vote of the board. Now, if the motion is put to the vote of the board after the expiry of four hours (at the most), it would atonce appear on that very day whether it is carried out or not carried out. The question of taking a poll on a subsequent day does not arise in this case, as it can arise in the case of the meetings of a company about which learned counsel for the petitioner has cited the cases referred above. Sec. 65 (9) of the Act further lays down that if a resolution expressing want of confidence is passed by the votes of a majority of the whole number of members at a special general meeting convened for the purpose, then every chairman or every vice-chairman against whom such a motion is passed shall forthwith be deemed to have vacated his office.

(3.)THUS, the term 'meeting' in all these sub-sections refers only to the meeting which is held on the date fixed for that purpose and the notion of continuation of that meeting to another date is clearly ruled out. Moreover the law does not contemplate any appeal against the decision announced in the said meeting and therefore ordinarily it would be final on that very day. This Court may in its extraordinary jurisdiction entertain a writ application in a certain case, but simply because that decision is declared by this Court to be correct or wrong it would not extend the date of the meeting of the municipal board to the date of the decision of this Court. In those types of cases where the decision of the Court results in a fresh appointment or a fresh removal or dismissal, it would be a different matter, but this is not a case of that kind. In the instant case, the very decision of the Court was that the petitioner would be deemed to continue in office from 27. 11. 59. If the contention which is now raised by the petitioner is accepted, then it would mean that there was a break in his office and he was rejected as a chairman on 13. 4. 60. This Court cannot however reelect a chairman who is legally ousted from his office. It can only set aside his ouster if it is illegal and so the petitioner would be deemed to have continued in office even after 27. 11. 59 though he may not have actually worked for a short time. Again, if the argument of the petitioner is allowed, then it is likely to create a strange anomaly. Take, for instances a case in which a vote of no-confidence against a chairman is declared not to have been carried out on 1. 1. 59. Another motion of no-confidence is therefore tabled after the expiry of 6 months and it is carried out on 1. 10. 59. Suppose further that some aggrieved member files on 1. 4. 59 a writ application in respect of the decision taken at the first meeting and it is contended that some valid votes were wrongly rejected by the prescribed authority and that if they were also counted against the chairman, the motion would have been held to be carried out. Now, if the decision of this writ application is given by the court on 1st November, 1959, can it be urged with any justification that the meeting of 1. 1. 59 should be taken as notionally extending upto 1. 11. 59, the period of six months should be computed from 1. 11. 59, and the motion carried out on 1st October, 1959, should be ignored. It need hardly be stressed that in a democratic body, a chairman remains in office only so long as he enjoys the confidence of the majority of its members. That is also the general scheme of the present Act. Sec. 72 (9) puts a limited restriction on the right of the members to bring a motion of a vote of no-confidence in the chairman in the circumstances detailed therein and it gives a corresponding limited protection to the chairman to remain in office for a period of six months from the date of the last meeting, if the motion of no-confidence fails on that date. It would not be proper for either party to stretch its plain meaning to suit their convenience. It is a wellknown principle of judicial interpretation that when the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then they should be understood in their natural and ordinary sense and the words themselves should be taken as best declaring the intention of the legislature. So interpreted, the date of meeting in the present case would be 27. 11. 59 and not 13. 4. 60 and the period of six months should be computed from the former date.
I therefore do not see any good ground to allow this writ application and it is hereby dismissed with costs. .

;