I.N.Modi, J. - (1.)This is a regular second appeal by the defendant State against the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, Udaipury dated the 5th November, 1957, in a suit for accounts.
(2.)The facts leading up to this appeal may shortly be stated as follows. The plaintiff Rao Manohar Singh of Bedla was a jagirdar in the former State of Mewar at all relevant times. That State was integrated in what may be called, for facility of reference, the first United State of Rajasthan in April, 1948. The last mentioned State was amalgamated with the former States of Jodhpur, Jaipur, Bikaner and Jaisalmer and the Matsya Union, as it then was, and the seconds United State of Rajasthan was formed in the middle of 1949. This last-mentioned State Was then formed-into the Part B State of Rajasthan with, the coming into effect of the Constitution on the 26th January, 1950, and is now represented by the present State of Rajasthan as it was formed under the States Reorganization Act, 1956 (No. XXXI of 1956). The first United State of Rajasthan issued Ordinances No. 27 of 1948 and Nos. 10 and 15 of 1949 by which the management of all Jagirs existing in that State including the Jagir of the present plaintiff was taken over by the then State by virtue of the provisions of those Ordinances. The result, therefore, was that when the second United State of Rajasthan was formed in May, 1949, these Ordinances were in force in a part of the State and the Jagirs in thaF area were managed by the State while similar Jagirs in other parts of the State continued to be managed by the Jagirdars themselves. It is admitted that in these circumstances, the plaintiff filed a writ application in this Court (being civil Misc. case No. 1 of 1951) by which the constitutional validity of these Ordinances was challenged. By its judgment dated the 11th December, 1951, it was held by a Bench of this Court that Section 8(a) which was introduced in Ordinance No. 27. of 1948 by Section 4 of Ordinance No. 10 of 1949 and the amendment of Section 8(a) by Section 3 of the Ordinance No. 15 of 1949 were unconstitutional and void under Article 13 (1) of the Constitution read with Article 14 thereof. In the result, the State was prohibited from collecting the rent from the tenants of land comprising the Jagir of Bedla which was held by the plaintiff. It may also be mentioned here that the matter was taken up by the State in appeal to the Supreme Court, and the decision of this Court was upheld, vide The State of Rajasthan v. Manoharsinghji, 1954 Raj LW 220 : (AIR 1954 SC 297). It is further common ground between the parties that before the decision of the Supreme Court was given, the defendant State had made over possession of the plaintiff's Jagir to him on the 22nd October, 1951. It will thus be observed that the defendant continued to collect the revenues of the plaintiffs estate after the Constitution came into force upto the 22nd October, 1951, and it is in respect of this period that the plaintiff has filed the present suit for accounts.
(3.)Before filing this suit, the plaintiff, according to paragraph No. 12 of the plaint, gave a notice to the defendant State under Section 80 C. P. C. This notice is stated to have been delivered to the State on the 12th May, 1954. It is alleged that by this notice, the plaintiff called upon the defendant to render the former an account of what it had realized on his behalf and also to explain to him why it had omitted to make certain realizations which should have been made and further to explain to him as to how it was justified in retaining certain amounts which it had done on the plaintiff's account. It is significant that in the written statement filed by the State no reply whatsoever has been made to this allegation. The defence of the State, put shortly, was that the plaintiff was not entitled to file a suit for accounts as instructions had been issued to various departments to explain the accounts to him from time to time and that the plaintiff had been understanding these accounts through his employees. It was further contended in this connection that the defendant ceased to be the statutory agent or manager of the plaintiff's Jagir from the commencement of the Constitution on the 26th January, 1950. Lastly it was contended that the plaintiff's suit was barred by limitation.
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