- (1.)THE appeal has been presented by the judgment-debtor and arises out of an execution case.
(2.)THE only point urged for consideration in this appeal is the question whether the application for execution was barred by limitation. On the 3rd April, 1952, a decree for a sum of over 10,000 rupees was passed in favour of the respondent-decree-holder as against the judgment-debtor appellant. It appears that an appeal was presented against the decree in question but the appeal was dismissed for non-payment of Talbana on the 16th March, 1953. THE present application for execution to which exception has been taken was filed on the l5th June, 1955. THE judgment-debtor contended that the application was time-barred because it was presented beyond three years from the date of the decree, that is, 3rd April, 1952. THE court below repelled this contention and held that the application for execution was within time under Art. 182 (2), Limitation Act, having been filed within three years from the date of the order dismissing the appeal against the the decree. THE learned District Judge in making the order in question relied upon the decisions in Mohammad Naqir vs. Alauddin Ahmad (1) as also Ramkumar vs. Rudra Dutt{2 ). THEse decisions undoubtedly support the view of the law taken by the learned Judge and there can be no doubt that the view is correct. A recent decision in Sashi Bhusan vs. Bhuneshwar (3) also supports the view. In that case, the appeal was dismissed for non-payment of printing cost, and it was held that the order amounted to a final order disposing of the appeal and consequently the period of limitation for presenting an application for execution ran from the date of that order as contemplated by Art. 182 (2) of the Limitation Act.
The appeal against the decree in this case appears to have been duly admitted and the appellant was called upon to deposit Talbana within a certain time. The order having not been complied with, the appeal was dismissed under rule 166 of the Rules of this Court. This was, therefore, clearly a final order disposing of the appeal itself and nothing further remained to be done in the appeal. In our opinion, this was a judicial order passed by the court and the rights of the parties in the appeal were in effect determined by virtue of this order. Therefore, it must be considered to be a final order disposing of the appeal. The execution petition filed within three years of the date of the order is within time. We see no substance in the point of limitation raised by the learned counsel for the appellant and we dismiss this appeal with costs. .

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