ROOP RAJ LAXMI Vs. SUB DIVISIONAL OFFICER JAIPUR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) MAHARAWAL Sangram Singhji was the former Jagirdar of Samod. He died on 15. 2. 1963 leaving behind him his son Rajeshwar Singh and widow Roop Raj Laxmi.

(2.) CHAPTER III-B was introduced in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 vide Act No. IV of 1960 published in Rajasthan Gazette dated 21. 3. 1960 which had come into force w. e. f. 15. 12. 1963 vide notification dated 26. 11. 1963. It was a socio-economic legislation. It was decided to acquire the surplus land from the person in whose hands the land was concentrated for fair distribution to the land-less agriculturists and other deserving persons with a view to remove the disparity in the holding of agricultural land and to increase the agricultural production. Section 30-E provided that the land would be surrendered from the date notified by the State Government and ultimately the date so notified was notified as 1. 4. 1966 for the purpose of declaring the land to be surplus in the hand of khatedar so entered in the Revenue Board on the date of notification.

(3.) THE contention of the petitioner is that her late husband Maharawal Sangram Singhji was possessing the land as Khudkasht situated in villages under Tehsil Jaipur, Amer and Jamwaramgarh. It is submitted that the petitioner was entitled to the share in the property left by her husband in her individual capacity irrespective of the fact whether the land is partitioned or not. THE petitioner wants to submit that before the notified date and also even before the coming into force of the Act, she and her son, Rajeshwar Singh, had become khatedars in equal share because of death of original khatedar and, therefore, she had got her shares separated by way of family agreement registered on 1. 6. 1970 and partition was affected in 1970's. As a matter of fact since 1963, she was deemed to be considered as a co-owner along with her son in equal share on the death of her husband in accordance with Hindu Succession Act and even if no partition actually had taken place between her and her son after the death of her husband by leaps and bounds, but on coming into force of the notified date, in that situation, she was notionally entitled to her own share and was to be treated as khate-dar in her own right in individual capacity and was entitled to one unit separately. She further submits that she was never depending on her son as she owned her own pro-perty and in view of the above narration of facts, the petitioner was entitled to be trea-ted as separate unit even if the old law is applied prior to the Amendment Act of 1973.