LAKHURAM HARIRAM Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this case the petitioner has brought a money suit in the Court of the Munsif, 1st Court, Chapra, against the opposite party for realising a sum of Rs. 2520 and odd, being the value of goods which were not delivered out of a particular consignment. In paragraph 5 of the plaint the petitioner alleged that notices under Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act and Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code had been sent to the opposite party per registered post on the 5th of June, 1950. The suit was contested by the opposite party on the ground that notices under Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act and Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code had not been served. During the trial of the suit the petitioner made an application on the 3rd of November, 1954, praying that the opposite party should be called upon to produce the register in which there were entries regarding receipt of notice and letters. The opposite party filed a rejoinder on the 23rd November, 1954, that no such register was maintained. Later on, on the 6th of January 1956, the petitioner made an application to the trial Court to the effect that they had come to know that a fife No. NCS/338/CPR of 1951 was maintained in the office or the Traffic Manager Gorakhpur, now called the Chief Commercial Superintendent o the North Eastern Railway with regard to his case and the petitioner requested that the opposite party should be called upon to produce the aforesaid me. Summons was issued by the Court on the Chief Commercial Superintendent of the North Eastern Railway at Gorakhpur calling upon him to produce the file NCS/338/CPR of 1951 and also the register oi notices kept in the General Managers office, showing receipt of notices for the mouth of June, 1950. On the 16th of March, 1956, a petition was filed in the trial Court by Sri Suraj Prasad Upadhya on behalf of the opposite party in obedience to thq summons sent to the Chief Commercial Superintendent of the North Eastern Railway. It was stated in that petition that the file in question could not be produced in Court because it contained privileged communications under Section 124 of the Indian Evidence Act. On the 27th April, 1956, there was an affidavit filed by the Senior law Inspector Sri R.S. Prasad to the effect that privilege was claimed by the Chief Commercial Superintendent under Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was also stated in the affidavit that the register could not be traced out though it had been diligently searched for. A rejoinder was filed by the Petitioner on 27-4-1956, contending that the file in question related to commercial transactions and was not in the nature of unpublished official records relating to affairs of State. It was submitted by the petitioner that the Court should itself inspect the documents and decide the question of privilege. The trial Court held it was satisfied from the affidavit of the Chief Commercial Superintendent that privilege was properly claimed under Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act and it was not permissible for the Court to look into the file on the question of privilege. Accordingly, the trial Court allowed the claim of the opposite party that the file in question was a privileged document within the meaning of Section 123 of the Indian. Evidence Act.

(2.) In support of this application the point taken on behalf of the petitioner is that the trial Court should have itself looked into the file before deciding the claim of privilege under Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act. We do not think that this argument is correct. Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act is in the following terms:

(3.) In our opinion, the principle is correctly expressed in all these authorities. In the present case, therefore, it is manifest that the contention of learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Court should have inspected the document to decide the question of privilege is unwarranted. It appears from the facts in this case that the lower Court was satisfied from the affidavit sworn by the Chief Commercial Superintendent that the document in question related to affairs of State as contemplated by Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was of course open to the lower Court to have taken other evidence on the point or even to have examined the Chief Commercial Superintendent in person. But the actual scope of the enquiry in the particular case is a matter of discretion with the trial Court. In the present case it is apparent that the trial Court was satisfied with the affidavit sworn by the Chief Commercial Superintendent and allowed the claim of privilege under Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act. In our opinion there has been no error of law committed by the lower Court. There is no merit in this application. We accordingly dismiss this application with costs.