Hari Lal Agrawal, J. - (1.)THIS is an application by the plaintiff-opposits party in revision which arises out of an arbitration matter. The question is as to whether the objection filed by defendant no. 1 Kewal Mandal (opposite party no. 1) dated the 29th March 1968 registered as Micellaneous Case no. 26 of 1968, for setting aside the award was barred by limitation. The court of appeal below in disagreement with the trial court has held that the said objection was well within time and, accordingly, the plaintiff opposite party in the aforesaid miscellaneous case came to this Court in revision.
(2.)NOW the relevant facts may be briefly stated. The petitioner opposite party no. 1 agreed to settle some land in dispute by an arbitration out of court. An agreement was, accordingly, executed by the parties and the same was duly registered on the 17th August 1968 appointing nine persons (opposite 2nd party) as arbitrators ; opposite party no. 2 being the umpire. It is not necessary to refer to the details of the dispute and the proceedings taken by the arbitrators in view of the nature of the question being raised for my consideration on behalf of the petitioner. On the 6th September, 1967, the petitioner filed an application under section 14 of the Arbitration Act in the court of First Munsif, making a prayer to order the arbitrators to file the award made by them, and after "giving notice to the opposite party (first party) regarding the filing of the aforesaid award in this court, this court be pleased to make the aforesaid award a rule of the court." The application was registered as Title Suit No. 105 of 1967. Notices were issued to the opposite parties and the service of notice was accepted as valid by an order dated the 9th December, 1967, on the same day the Umpire (opposite party no. 2) filed the award in court which was kept in a sealed cover as requested. The court below directed the opposite party to file their written objections to the award, if any, by the 10th January 1968, On the 10th January 1968, as the opposite no. 1 did not appear, the court below directed for filing of requisites for issue of notice to him and adjourned the matter to the 25th January 1968, for filing objection to the award. The matter was again adjourned to 13th February 1968 for filing objection. On the 13th February 1968, opposite party no. 1 appeare and formally applied for time. The prayer was allowed and he was ordered to file his obje:tion by the 5th March 1968, on the 5th March 1968, opposite party no. 1 again applied for time on the ground that copies of necessary documents were not received by him so far. His prayer was allowed and he was directed to file his objection by the 29th March 1968, opposite party no. 1 filed his objection to the award on the 29th March 1968 with a prayer that the award should not be accepted and made a rule of the court. This application was registered as Miscellaneous Case no. 26 of 1968 on the 2nd of May 1968. On the 20th July 1968 the petitioner filed rejoinder to the above objection petition. A plea was also taken that the objection petition filed by opposite party no. 1 was barred by limitation.
The trial court held that the award was invalid on account of misconduct of some of the Arbitrator and the Umpire and was improperly procured. It also held that the objection petition filed by opposite party no. 1 was barred by time and it, accordingly dismissed the miscellaneous case in question. The opposite party no. 1 then challenged the order of the trial court before the court of appeal below. The court of appeal below took a different view on the question of limitation and held that the objection to the award filed on 29.3.1968 was well within time from 5.3.1968 the date of knowledge. It was the first date after the filing of the award on 9.12,1967 that the opposite-party no. 1 had applied for time.

In the court of appeal below, however, the finding of the trial court on the question of invalidity of the award was not successfully challenged. The appeal was, accordingly, allowed.

(3.)IN this court Mr. Parmanand Sharan Sinha in support of this application contended that the objection petition filed by opposite party no. 1 should be held to be barred by limitation. It is difficult to accept this contention as the period of limitation under Article 119 (b) for setting aside an award starts running from the date of the service of the notice of the filing of the award. The notice that was filed in this case on opposite party no. 1, as stated earlier, was the notice of the application of the petitioner. That was an application under section 14(2) and not of the filing of the award ; rather the award was filed in pursuance of the application of the petitioner aforesaid on the 9th December, 1967. Any period before the filing of the award was, therefore, wholly irrelevant. Mr. Sinha places reliance on a decision of this Court in Bahadur Singh v. Fuleshwar Singh and other, (AIR 1969 Patna 114) and contended that the service of a notice contemplated within Article 119 (b) would include constructive or informal notice as well. IN that case, after the filing of the award an application for its inspection was filed and the objection was filed beyond the period of thirty days therefrom. IN this circumstance, it was held that defendant no. 1 should be deemed to have constructive or informal knowledge of the filing of the award and the period of limitation fixed for the same had expired by that time. It is plain from the above authority itself that an application under the Arbitration Act to set aside an award must be filed within thirty days from the date of the service of notice of the filing of the award. IN a case, therefore, where there is no notice to the party concerned, even constructive or informal, period of limitation would not begin to run. The contention of Mr. Sinha that the position of opposite party No. 1, who instituted the miscellaneous case in question, was that of a plaintiff and, therefore he should have made necessary statement for condoning the delay in filing the objection must be rejected for the simple reason that the period of limitation has not expired for filing of the objection in question, and no averments were required to be made in the objection petition. IN any view of the matter, the trial court under the relevant orders was extending the date for filing objections by the parties and it cannot be disputed that section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, applies also to an application under the Arbitration Act to set aside an award. It is, however, not necessary to take recourse to the provisions of section 5 at all in this case because, the question of enlarging the period fixed by the Act did not arise. According to the scheme of the Arbitration Act itself, the commencement of the period of limitation for an application under Article 119 (h) takes place only after the parties have been served either with a notice of the filing of the award or as held by this court in the above mentioned decision, they derive knowledge of the said fact even in an informal manner ; and not before that. IN this case the court of appeal below is right in holding that opposite party no. 1 became aware of the fact of filing the award for the first time on 5th March, 1968. The objection filed on the 29th March 1968 was therefore well within time.
I do not, therefore, find any merit in this application and it is, accordingly, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Application dismissed.