S.N.Jha, J. - (1.) THIS application has been filed for quashing the order taking cognizance for offences under Section 498-A/406/34, Indian Penal Code and the entire proceeding.
(2.) COGNIZANCE has been taken on the complaint of Nita Khanna. opposite party No. 2. According to her, after marriage with the petitioner on 12-3-1990 solemnized at Amritsar, she was ill-treated by the accused persons, the husband and in-laws, because her father could not satisfy the demand of dowry. At times she was assaulted. As a result of cruelty, torture and harassment meted out to her, she was forced to leave her matrimonial home and live with her parents at Dhanbad. On 12-8-1991 a son was also born but accused persons did not even care to come over and see him. It is said that at the time of marriage, gold ornaments weighing 40 tolas and Rs. 50,000 in cash as well as many personal and house effects were given by her parents for her benefit and use which were entrusted to the accused persons. The complainant was not allowed to bring them back. The validity of the order is challenged on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. It is said that entire occurrence allegedly having taken place at Amritsar, the Dhanbad Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and take cognizance. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the source of jurisdiction of the Dhanbad Court is sought to be found is Section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ('the Code', in short) but the said provisions is not applicable. Counsel contended that in order to attract the provisions of Section 179, the consequence of the act should not only be the integral part of the offence but that the act and the consequence must together constitute the offence. Where the act by itself constitutes an offence or, in other words, where the offence is complete by reason of the act itself irrespective of the consequence that ensued, Section 179 has no application. Counsel in support of his contention placed reliance on M. A. Alexander and Anr. v. Claim Alexander , and Gonga Jaiswal v. Chhotelal Jain .
(3.) COUNSEL for the complainant-opposite party, on the other hand, submitted that at this stage the Court has to go by the allegations alone. In the absence of evidence which is yet to come it cannot be said as to where the entrustment of property had taken place constituting the offence of criminal broach of trust under Section 406, I.P.C. COUNSEL stated that so far as the other offence under Section 498-A is concerned, it is not necessary to go into the question of consequence. COUNSEL made reference to various paragraphs of the complaint petition. He contended that so far as this Court is concerned the point is concluded by the decision in the case of Sardar Harpal Singh v. Balbinder Pal Kaur reported in 1991 Eastern India Criminal Cases 756.;