Mahapatra, J. - (1.) Plaintiff is the appellant. He owns a holding, No. 5 in Ward No. 6 of the Sahibgauj Municipality, The assessment of that holding to municipal-tax had been fixed on a valuation at Rs. 3,500/- in the revised assessment of the years 1948-49. Plaintiff objected to that. He instituted a suit challenging that assessment, but he failed ultimately, when the case came before the High Court in a second appeal. Under Section 106 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922, the next quinquennial revised assessment was made in the Sahibganj Municipality in the year 1954-55. This time, the valuation of the holding was raised from Rs. 3,500/- to Rs. 4,900/-, on which the assessment was levied. Plaintiff objected to that by filing an application, as contemplated under Section 116 of the Act (vide Exhibit B/2). In that, he raised his objection against the increase in the valuation of the holding and asked his valuation to be fixed at Rs. 500/-. Upon that the Municipality constituted a committee of three commissioners as provided in Clause (2) of Section 117 of the Act; and the committee after consideration of the plaintiff's objections reduced the valuation from Rs. 4,900/- to Rupees 3,500/-. This valuation did not satisfy the plaintiff. He instituted the present suit raising several allegations against the re-assessment and urged the Illegality committed by the Municipality in fixing the valuation as well as in adopting the re-assessment. He also challenged the jurisdiction of the Municipality in this respect. Several other objections were raised in the suit. We are not concerned with them. The trial Court and the lower appellate Court dismissed the plaintiff's suit, mostly on the view that had been expressed on similar kinds of objections against the re-assessment in the year 1948-49 by the High Court in the second appeal between the same parties. The plaintiff has, therefore, come up to this Court in appeal.
(2.) The only point that was canvassed with seriousness by the learned counsel for the appellant is that his objection, filed under Section 116 of the Act, was not considered by a properly constituted committee. The committee which decided his objections had no jurisdiction inasmuch as his objections should have been placed before a committee as envisaged under Clause (1) of Section 117, i.e., a committee consisting of two commissioners, two tax-payers of the Municipality and one servant of the Government, not below the rank of a Deputy Magistrate, nominated by the District Magistrate. Learned Counsel's contention is that if his objections were to be considered by a committee of that nature, then his objections could not be said to have been legally disposed of and the levy of the municipal-tax on the basis of the re-assessment made under Section 106 could not be continued. I am afraid, this proceeds on the erroneous assumption that the objections filed under Section 116 in the present case came under Clause (1) of Section 117 and not under Clause (2) of that section. Section 106 provides: "106: (1) New valuation and assessment lists shall ordinarily be prepared, in the same manner as the original lists, once in every five years. Section 116 which enables a tax-payer to file objections is as follows: "116. (1) Any person who is dissatisfied with the amount assessed upon him or with the valuation or assessment of any holding, or who disputes his occupation of any holding or his liability to be assessed, may apply to the Commissioners to review the amount of assessment or valuation, or to exempt him from the assessment or tax.
(3.) Thus, we find that a person can have objection to the valuation of the holding as made by the Municipality either at its original assessment or at a quinquennial revised assessment, or at any alteration made in such valuation under Section 107 of the Act. He can also have objection to the amount assessed upon him or the assessment itself. His objection may also be relating to his liability or on the ground of occupation of the holding in question. The reliefs that he can seek under that section arc that the amount of assessment or valuation may be reviewed or reduced or he may totally be exempted from any assessment or tax. The different kinds of reliefs and objections as envisaged in the Section (Section 116) have been dealt with differently in Section 117 which imposes an obligation on the Municipality to constitute committees of two kinds to consider the objections that may be filed under Section 116. Clause (1) of Section 117 states: "Every application presented under the last preceding section relating to assessment made under Section 89, Section 105, Section 107 or Section 113 shall be heard and determined by a Committee consisting of two Commissioners and two tax-payers of the municipality............and one servant of the Government ............ and that three members shall form the quorum." It is worthy of note that an application relating to valuation is not included in this clause. Sub-clause (2) of Section 117 states: "117. (2) All applications presented under the last preceding section, other than the applications referred to in Sub-suction (1), shall be heard and determined by a committee consisting of not less than three Commissioners, provided that no Commissioner shall be a member of the Committee appointed to hear applications from the ward for which he was elected." It is clear that the applications relating to valuation, non-liability to tax or assessment which can be made under Section 116 are kept out from Clause (1) of Section 117 and are provided for in Clause (2) of that section. There appears to he some justification in principle for this differential treatment of different kinds of the objections, The constitution of the committee in Sub-clause (2) is different from that provided in Clause (i). In the present case, the committee that considered the plaintiff's objections filed under Section 116 of the Act consisted of three commissioners, and there was nothing wrong in it. They did not lack in jurisdiction, nor is it alleged that there was any failure of the principles of natural justice in the discharge of their duties in the matter of consideration of the plaintiff's objections about the valuation of the holding. In that view, the learned counsel's contention that his objections had not been disposed of in accordance with law cannot be sustained.;