RAM LAKHAN SAO Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner, Babu Lakhan Sao who is a dealer in kerosene oil, has been convicted under Section 7, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, and has been sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-. On 3-3-1949, the premises of the petitioner were visited by, the supply inspector who found nine tins of kerosene oil in excess of the number of tins shown in his register. The inference to be drawn from this in the absence of any reasonable explanation by the petitioner would, of course, be that he intended to dispose of these nine tins in the black-market. The explanation which the petitioner put forward at the trial was that the tins in question were part of a larger consignment of twenty-five tins which he had that day sold to one Sankar Ram. According to the petitioner, Sankar Ram took away sixteen tins out of the twenty-five tins which he had purchased and left nine tins there intending to come back and take delivery of them later. It does not appear that this explanation was put forward by the petitioner immediately; nor does it appear that there were on the premises of the petitioner nine tins which had been specifically put aside; It is quite clear that what the inspector found was an excess in the stock. The finding of fact arrived at by the Courts below was, in my opinion, undoubtedly correct. Mr. Nageshwar Prasad for the petitioner has raised a somewhat curious point of law. The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, is a temporary Act and Sub-section (3) of Section 1 states that "It shall cease to have effect on the expiration of the period mentioned in Section 4, India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946." The India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, which was an Act of the British Parliament conferred temporarily on the Central Legislature a power to make laws with respect to matters which otherwise would have been exclusively within the legislative jurisdiction of the provincial legislatures. Section 4 provided that the duration of legislative powers conferred by the Act should be

(2.) Mr. Nageshwar Prasad has next pointed out that the license of the petitioner was not produced at the trial and has suggested that as the license was not before the Court there was no legal evidence that any provision contained in the license had been contravened. The license must, however, be in a form prescribed by the Kerosene Oil Control Order, 1948, and that form is set out in the order itself. The Courts are thus entitled to take judicial notice of the form of license. Mr. Nageshwar Prasad pointed out that it was open to the authority granting the license to exempt a particular licensee from anyone or more of the conditions contained in the license. There is no reason to presume that the petitioner was granted any such exemption.

(3.) A rule was issued on the petitioner to show cause why his sentence should not be enhanced. The petitioner is a man of sixty-five, and in view of this the learned trying Magistrate would appear to have exercised his discretion reasonably in not imposing a sentence of imprisonment. The learned Government Advocate is not in a position to tell us what the status of the petitioner is or how lucrative his business is. The learned trying Magistrate was thus very probably in a much better position than we are to decide what an appropriate fine would be. In my judgment, the application ought to be dismissed, and the rule which has been issued ought to be discharged.