P.SOUTHBY TAILYOUR Vs. PRONOTI SINGH
LAWS(HPH)-1997-5-61
HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
Decided on May 23,1997

P.SOUTHBY TAILYOUR Appellant
VERSUS
PRONOTI SINGH Respondents


Referred Judgements :-

STATE OF HARYANA V. CANDRA MANI AND ORS [REFERRED TO]


JUDGEMENT

M.SRINIVASAN,C.J. - (1.)The proposed appeal is barred by limitation and there is a delay of 77 days in presenting the appeal. This application for condonation of delay sets out the circumstances causing the delay in the following words: "That the counsel of the Appellants had to leave a few days early on 5.1.1997 for Ghaziabad for winter vacations. The Counsel directed his. Court Clerk Mr. Ramesh Kumar to keep track of when the Order would be passed and to have an application moved for certified copy when the order is finally passed. Due to bonafide mistake on the part of the Clerk, he failed to learned that the order was passed on 7.1.1996; a few days before the winter vacations. That after the vacations, on learning that the order has been passed, an application for the certified copy was moved -on 10.3.1997 that the clerk requested for and obtained a photocopy of the Order from the plaintiff Counsel on 11.3.1997. This copy was sent to the Appellants counsel at Delhi on 11.3.1997 for information. That the Clerk kept enquiring from the copying branch whether the certified, copy was ready, but failed to locate and receive the copy. The certified copy was received on 29.4.1997. It is submitted that the delay was due to bona fide mistake, in -advertent and it is prayed that the delay may kindly be condoned.
(2.)A perusal of the above two paragraphs shows that there is no explanation for the delay as such. The averments are as vague as possible and there is no attempt to place before the Court how the delay is bona fide. The order was passed on 7.1.1997 and it is not in dispute that it was shown in the supplementary cause -list. Hence, on the day on which the order was passed, counsel on record had notice that the order would be passed on that date. There is no explanation as to why the counsel did not take note of the order and takes steps to file an application for copies. The last portion of the aforesaid paragraphs is also vague and it merely says that the delay in preparing appeal from 11.3.1997 till 30.4.1997 was due to time lost in communication between Delhi, England and Shimla. If the party is outside the country and interested in litigation, such party must take appropriate steps in time to comply with the provisions of Law, which govern the limitation for preferring an appeal. A party cannot claim a special privilege under the provisions of the Limitation Act Learned counsel for the petitioner draws our attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani & Ors. J. T. 1996(3) S.C. 1371. After referring to various decisions under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Court said as follows: - "It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court - be it by private party, or the State -ye barred by limitation and this Court generally adogts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even -handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note - making, file -pushing, and passing -on the buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officer/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise -is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice - oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every days delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice -oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis -a -vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require -adjustment and should authorise the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Considered from the perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in" this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay."
(3.)In the next paragraph, the Supreme Court said that on the facts and circumstances of the case, it was a fit case for condoning, the delay. Thus the Court took note of the facts and circumstances of the case before it and the Court never intended that a general proposition that .every delay must be condoned. It u also seen from the passage extracted above that the Court has taken care to state that the State Government cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. In that case, the State Government was the appellant and that weighed with the Court while it considered the application for condonation of delay. The Court also observed that the individual would always be quick in taking decision whether he would always be quick in taking decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. The Court adds "considered from this perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay." That circumstance is a vital circumstances which was taken not of by the Supreme Court while it considered the application for condonation of delay. It is not the State Government or the Central Government, which is a party in this case. The appellant are not any governmental bodies and they are only individuals. In such circumstances, we do not find any justification to apply the aforesaid ruling and condone the delay of 77 days, which, in our opinion, has not been explained. Hence, this application is dismissed.


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