PARKASH CHAND Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner herein has been convicted by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Una Under Section 7 of the Prevention of' Ticketless Travelling Act, 1976 read with Rule 4. 43 (XXI)/ Section 112 of the Motor Vehicles Act. He has been sentenced by the learned Magistrate to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- and in default of payment of fine he is ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 15 days. The learned Magistrate has also ordered that the Con- ductor's Licence which is held by the petitioner be cancelled for a period of one month Under Section 21-G of the Motor Vehicles Act.

(2.) THE main point which arises to be determined in this petition is whether the. learned Chief Judicial Magistrate who has tried this case summarily has been properly authorised to hold the trial in a summary way.

(3.) ON this question the contention which is raised by the learned Advocate of the petitioner is that Under Section 10 of the Himachal Pradesh Prevention of Ticketless Travel in Road Transport Service Act. 1976, the learned Magistrate can hold trial only if he is especially empowered to try offences under this Act. In order to appreciate this contention, it will be necessary to quote Section 10 of this Act on which reliance is placed. This section is in the following terms :-- 10, (1) All offences under this Act shall be triable by Magistrates having jurisdiction in the area and especially empowered by the High Court Under Section 260 of the Cr. P. C. , 1973 to try such offences in a summary way. (2) No prosecution under this Act shall be instituted except on the complaint in writing by such officer as may be authorised in this behalf by the State Government. The contention of the learned Advocate of the petitioner is that though it is true that the learned Magistrate was having jurisdiction in the area concerned and had also jurisdiction to try in a summary way the offences contemplated by Section 260 of the Cr. P. C ;, the above quoted Section 10 of the Act stipulates specifically that he should be empowered to try the offence arising out of the Act in a summary manner and since no such empowerment is found to have been made in favour of the learned Magistrate, the trial in which the petitioner is convicted should be treated as having been without jurisdiction. In support of this contention Shri Ahuja learned Advocate of the petitioner puts emphasis on the word "such" used before the word "offences" in the last part of the above quoted Sub-section (1) of Section 10.