PRITAM SINGH Vs. CHARAN DASS DOGRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioners are defendants in a suit filed by Shri Charan Dass Dogra, Advocate, Kulu (respondent No. 1) for the reliefs of declaration that the plaintiff be declared primary and active member of the Congress organisation and of permanent injunction restraining the petitioner-defendants from holding District Congress Committee (DCC) elections and thereafter Himachal Pradesh Congress Committee (HPCC) election. The plaintiff's contention in short is that he is President of DCC Kulu and as such an active member of the Congress Organisation. He has been illegally ousted from membership and hence is not given right to vote and contest the elections. Alongwith the plaint, an application for interim injunction was given under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, restraining the petitioner-defendants from holding the aforesaid elections. The learned Sub-Judge First Class, Kulu. granted the interim relief of injunction and has withheld the elections of the Executive at the District level and also at the provincial level with the necessary consequence that a representative of Himachal Pradesh has been debarred from sitting in the elections of the All- India Congress Committee (AICC). The petitioner-defendants have gone in appeal before the learned District Judge, Mandi, but the appeal is not yet decided and a date has been fixed in the last week of March, 1973 for the disposal of such appeal. According to the revised programme for organisational elections of 1972 (Annexure A), the elections at the PCC level were to be completed by 10th December, 1972. The election of the members of the AICC, according to the programme, had to take place on 10th December. 1972. Similarly the election of the Congress President had to take place on 10th December, 1972. As a result to the injunction granted by the Courts below, all these elections have been held up.

(2.) Since the matter could not brook delay and called for immediate attention of the High Court, this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution read with Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code, has been instituted. aS observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamurhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. (AIR 1967 SC 1494). the High Court while exercising its powers of superintendence can correct errors of various kinds of the subordinate Courts in appropriate cases. Therefore, the power of High Court under Article 227 is of a wider amplitude. However, the very plenitude of power imposes a restriction namely, that the power of superintendence is to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate Court within the scope of its authority and not for merely correcting its errors (see: Kailashchandra v. District Judge. Bhopal. AIR 1963 Madh Pra 218). In Bhola Hardial v. Kurra Ram Wasu Mal. (AIR 1962 Punj 441). it was observed that the powers of a High Court under Article 227 are more akin to the re-visional powers though these powers are described in the Constitution as "power of superintendence". In that case, the learned Judge did not seek to interfere under Article 227 because the order of the tribunal was revisable by a superior tribunal constituted by the statute and instead of getting reliefs from that revising tribunal, the petitioner had come direct to civil court. In a recent decision of Delhi High Court reported in Krishan Lal v. Ramo Devi (AIR 1973 Delhi 21) the learned Judge observed that the High Court would be justified in interfering under Article 227 where a subordinate Court has acted in disregard of the requirements of a statutory provision ' and the determination is opposed to law.

(3.) Keeping regard to the above noted pronouncements as to the scope of authority of High Court under Article 227. it would be safe for me to conclude that interference under Article 227 would, in any case, be amenable where there is a question of exercise or non-ex-ercise of jurisdiction or of an error apparent on the face of the record.