Mishra, C.J. - (1.)THIS is an application under Art. 226 of the constitution for the issue of a writ of Mandamus. The Petitioner Muthavarapu Anantha Ramiah is an inhabitant of Huzurnagar taluq, Nalgonda District, and carries on 26 -45 -1951, opposite party No. 1, P. Venket Ratnam, the Proprietor of Rama Mohan Motor Service, Vijayawada, was granted renewal for one year of his previous permit for plying stage carriages on Suriapet -Jagayyapet route. It is alleged by the Petitioner that the granting of the aforesaid permit is in flagrant violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 57, Motor Vehicles Act. The specific complaint is that the non -adherence to the procedure laid down in the above section has operated to deprive the vested legal right of the Petitioner to take objection to the grant and that the action of the Regional Transport authority in issuing the permit otherwise than in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the section is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction.
(2.)SECTION 57(1) relates to the procedure which had to be followed in granting 'contract carriage permits' or private carrier's permits. It has no application to cases of 'stage carriage permits with which we are now concerned Sub -section (2) of that section deals with the latter but it has to be read with S.47. Representations against the application made by persons for running stage carriage within the state are allowed by S.47 of the Act and under it there are only 3 classes of persons who are given this right:
(a) persons already providing road transport on any proposed route or routes;

(b) a local or police authority within whose jurisdiction any part of the proposed route (or routes) lies; and

(c) an association interested in the provision of road transport facilities .

The applicant does not come within any one of these categories and the question which arises for consideration is whether it open to him to invoke the aid of this Court by way of Mandamus under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

It is concede that the order complained of does not in any manner violate the Petitioner's fundamental rights. The contention urged on behalf of the applicant is the since this Court has a right to issue writs not only to protect persons whose fundamental rights have been invaded, but also 'for any other purpose the Petitioner is entitled to relief. The words 'for any other purpose' have been interpreted from time to time by the High Courts and the decisions are uniform that they contemplate only the enforcement of a legal right or performance to refer to the Full Bench case of the Patna High Court in - Bagaram v. state of Bihar : AIR 1950 Pat 387 (A). The observation of Mredith C.J. in that case may here be reproduced:

It is quite clear that these words have been added advisedly and must mean something in addition to the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III and this is no whether they be read ejusdem generis or otherwise. It is also clear because Art. 32, which is the corresponding provision for the Supreme Court does not contain these words, but speaks merely of the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part, and that is obviously because the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court extends only to the enforcement of the fundamental rights.

The learned Chief Justice then went on to observe:

....Art. 226 contemplates the issue of writs and directions for purposes other than the enforcement of the fundamental rights. At the same time the words can hardly mean that the High Court can issue writs for any purpose it pleases. I think the correct interpretation is that the words mean for the enforcement of any legal right and the performance of any legal duty. To that extent the words must be read 'ejusdem generis which is the ordinary principle of construction.

(3.)ON behalf of the applicant it is said that he had a legal right to raise objection to the grant of stage carrier's permit to the opposite party No. 1 and that this right was denied to him. We have already mentioned that is not correct as he is not one of the person referred to in Section 47.