KARNAIL SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS judgment of mine will dispose of Regular First Appeal Nos. 1328 of 1986 filed by the appellant-claimant and 1273 of 1986 filed by the State of Punjab, as both arise out of one and the same award dated 3rd February, 1986 given by the District Judge, Ropar. Compensation for the land was determined by a separate award. By virtue of the present award of the District Judge, compensation has been determined for fruit trees numbering 400 Land was acquired by issuance of notification dated 11th January, 1980 and the Corrigenda of the same was published on 18th March, 1980. The Land Acquisition Collector determined the compensation of 150 guava trees at Rs. 22,901. 3. 5 paise. On reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act ('the Act' for short), it has been found by the District Judge that the number of trees was not 150 as wrongly claimed in the reply to notice under Section 9 of the Act rather it was 400, as has been claimed in the reference under Section 18 of the Act. The learned District Judge assessed the compensation of 400 guava trees at Rs. 89,00/- relying upon the formula invented by Harbans Singh on the basis of rates prevalent in the year 1966 and after giving an increase of 100 per cent in accordance with the ratio of a Division Bench decision in Ranjit Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, 1983 P. L. J. 2s0. At this stage paragraph 11 of the afore quoted judgment must be noted : "the learned counsel for the claimants, however, pointed out that this formula was published in the year 1966 and was based on the market conditions prevalent then and therefore , the claimants are entitled to claim a substantial increase in the price of the fruit trees to be assessed on the basis of this formula. They point out that since the publication of this formula in the year 1966, the wholesale price index of that year (144. 3) had risen to 309. 1 in the year 1975 as per the bulletins published by the Economic Adviser, Ministry of Industry and Civil Supplies, Government of India, New Delhi. It deserves to be mentioned here that to this case the notification under Section 4 of the Act was published on December 28, 1974. Thus according to the learned counsel the appellant is entitled if not to 114. 2 percent of increase over the price of fruit trees worked out on the basis of this formula, then at least to 100 per cent of the price of the fruit trees workable on the basis of the said formula. The learned counsel for the acquiring authorities are neither in a position to challenge the correctness of the wholesale price index as published by the Government of India nor do they dispute that since the year 1966 the price of land as also of the fruit trees has seen a tremendous increase. They, however, maintain that it is difficult to determine that increase with any precision. That is true, yet in these matter, in the very nature of the things the market value of the acquired property cannot be determined with any exactitude and has essentially to be fixed on the basis of some reasonable method in the light of that we are of the considered opinion that the claimant at least is entitled to an increase of 100 per cent instead of 114. 2 percent over the price of fruit trees workable on the basis of the above noted formula published S. Harbans Singh. We are unable to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that it was primarily for the claimant to prove the inadequacy of the compensation awarded to him and the Government or the acquiring authorities had no duty in the matter and they could wait the proof of claim in complacency like a defendant, and without assisting the Court by all the materials at their command. The mere dismissal of the claim of the appellants unsubstantiated by evidence would certainly not imply that the Court has no duty to fix the quantum of compensation payable under the Act independently and upon materials available and by all means in its power. "

(2.) THE short arguments of Mr. M. L. Sarin, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. J. R. Joshi, Advocate, is that if the Division Bench in Ranjit Singh's case (supra) could have given an increase of 100 per cent over and above the formula on the prevailing rates in the year 1966 when the Division Bench was dealing with notification dated 28th December, 1974, this Court must give further increase of at least 60 per cent in view of the time-lag between notification dated 28th December, 1974 which was of the subject matter of compensation in the Ranjit Singh's case (supra) and 18th March, 1980 the date on which the land along with trees was acquired in the present case. In support of his argument, the learned counsel has placed reliance on two judgments. The first is the judgment of J. S. Sekhon, J. in (Gokal Chand v. The State of Punjab, R. F. A. No. 45 of 1986), Regular First Appeal No. 45 of 1986, decided on October 31, 1988. The following observations of J. S. Sekhon, J. can fruitfully be relied upon :" the perusal of the above findings leaves no doubt that 100 per cent increase was allowed in assessing the market value of the fruit trees on the basis of the formula approved land by the Punjab Government in the year 1966. In the case in hand, the land having been acquired on 11th November, 1975, the claimants are entitled to 114 percent increase over the compensation of the fruit trees assessed on the basis of the formula of the year 1966. Thus, the compensation of the acquired fruit trees is enhanced to Rs. 19260/- while accepting this appeal with proportionate costs. The appellants shall also be entitled to the benefits of the amended provisions of the Act over the enhanced amount of compensation". The second case on which a strong reliance has been placed is Inder Singh v. The State of Punjab and Anr. , (1988-2) 94 P. L. R. 190. In that case, M. S. Liberhan, J has laid down that the prices are increasing and therefore, a judicial notice of the increase has to be taken. It was also held that the intention of the legislature to recognise the increase of 12 per cent in price every year can be inferred from the amended provisions of the Act. By purusing the aforementioned two decisions, it can safely be held that whenever there is time-lag between the issuance of the notification, i. e. , the one regarding which the compensation has already been determined and the one regarding which the Court is determining the compensation, a necessary increase of 12 per cent every year should be given whether the Court is determining the market value of the land or of the trees. In other words, the premium should be given assuming that the price rise every year is there since it is continuing phenomenon. In this view of the matter, I am of the view that it would be just equitable and fair to hold that the appellant-claimant is entitled to an increase of 60 per cent more than what has been given by the learned District Judge.

(3.) BEFORE parting with the judgment, an argument of Mr. Jasbir Singh counsel for the Punjab State Electricity Board deserves to be noticed. It has been argued by him that the District Judge has erred in granting compensation for 400 guava trees. The precise argument of the learned counsel is that once the claimant in reply to notice under Section 9 of the Act stated that there were 150 trees, he cannot claim for 400 trees. This argument is unacceptable. There is absolutely no reason to disbelieve the statements of Baldev Singh Inspector Horticulture PW-1 and Durga Singh, Field Kanungo PW-3 who have stated that 400 trees of the claimant were acquired. The statements of the aforesaid two witnesses find sufficient corroboration from the document Exhibit P-5 an estimate got prepared by the State referring the existence of 400 guava trees. In the award also the reference is to 400 trees. In view of these facts having been proved on the record of the case, the State cannot be allowed to take the benefit of the reply filed by the claimant which is proved to be factually erroneous. I, therefore, endorse the findings of the learned District Judge that guava trees in existence at the time of acquisition were 400 and not 150.