SUKHDEV SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India relates to quashment of punishments awarded by the Jail authorities to the petitioner who was convicted and sentenced under Section 303 Indian Penal Code by General Court Martial. (GOC 855 Comb WKSP EME) on 26th December, 1977. The first jail punishment was awarded on 11th July, 1979 whereby, the petitioner was expelled, from remission system on the ground that he had instigated other prisoners not to do work. The second jail punishment was awarded on 17th February, 1980 on the same ground and earned remission of two months 7 days was directed to be forfeited. The third jail punishment was awarded on 2nd March, 1984, whereby 8 days remission of the petitioner was forfeited on the ground that he fells intoxicants in the jail.

(2.) ON behalf of the petitioner it has been mainly contended on the basis of authority in case Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1980 SC 1579, that the concurrence of the Sessions Judge was not obtained in respect of either of the aforesaid Jail punishments awarded to the petitioner. On behalf of the State it was contended that in all these cases the punishment awarded by the jail authorities were sent for confirmation to the Inspector General of Prisons who approved the punishment awarded to the petitioner. Mere fact that the approval of Inspector General of Prisons was obtained regarding jail punishment awarded to the petitioner would not fulfil the lacuna in the case of the respondents. In view of the afore cited authority in Sunil Batra's case, it was obligatory for the Jail authorities to inform the Sessions Judge of any punitive action taken against a prisoner within two days of such action. No such intimation concerning the jail punishments awarded to the petitioner referred to above was admittedly sent to the learned Sessions Judge for his approval. In these circumstances the mere fact that the petitioner was either given full opportunity to defend himself, or, that he himself confessed his guilt or begged pardon would be no ground to sustain the impugned orders for awarding punishment to the petitioner.