JASWANT SINGHS Vs. HARJIT KAUR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a petition under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, filed by Jaswant Singh and his parents Sohan Singh and Shrimati Mohinder Kaur, for the quashing of the proceedings pending in the court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Amritsar, initiated by Harjit Kaur respondent, wife of Jaswant Singh petitioner. It is needless to go into the protracted litigious course adopted by the parties in this matrimonial dispute. For the purpose of the present petition, it should suffice to say that the respondent wife filed a complaint before the trial Court purporting to be under section 406, Indian Penal Code and section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, against the three petitioners, alleging inter alia that the marriage between the parties took place on May 15, 1971. Thereafter, the parties lived together as husband and wife at the house of the petitioner No. 1 and had three children from this wedlock. According to the allegation in the complaint, dowry to the tune of Rs. 20,000/ - was given by the father of the respondent to the petitioners as per list attached with the complaint. These articles were to remain in trust with the petitioners. It was further alleged that the petitioners made more demands for some other articles which could not be met by the father of the respondent. No details of there demands are forthcoming in the complaint. It is, however, stated that about three years before the filing of the present complaint, the respondent was turned out of the house by the petitioners in her bare clothes and in spite of a Panchayat having been taken to them, the respondent was not rehabilitated. At the end of the complaint, the allegation made is that a demand was made from the petitioners for the return of the articles of dowry on many occasions, but without effect. Ultimately, (as alleged in the complaint) about seven or eight days before the filing of the complaint, another demand was made for the return of these articles by "some other responsible persons of the city", but the petitioners refused to oblige them. The respondent, therefore, prayed that the petitioners be proceeded against under the law.

(2.) AFTER the registration of the above complaint, the respondent led some preliminary evidence including her own statement and that of some witnesses and considering this material, the trial Court thought it expedient to summon the petitioners for both the offences namely, under section 406, Indian Penal Code, and section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. This action of the trial Court has prompted the petitioners to approach this Court to seek redress under the inherent powers vested under section 482. Code of Criminal Procedure.

(3.) AFTER hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I find that the present is pre -eminently a case of abuse of the process of Court requiring interference under section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure. Without reference to the merits of the case, even two points are sufficient to warrant action, as stated above. Section 8 -A of the Dowry Prohibition Act (as amended for Punjab) clearly postulates that no prosecution shall be instituted against any person in respect of any offence committed under the Act without the previous sanction of the District Magistrate or of such officer as the State Government my by special or general order appoint in this behalf. It is not disputed even by the learned counsel or the respondent that no such sanction was obtained before launching he present complaint against the petitioners. In the absence of this sanction, the jurisdiction of the trial Court to the cognisance of the complaint was completely barred. It is surprising that this patent fact as not even noticed by the trial Court. In so far as the alleged offence under section 406, Indian Penal Code, is concerned, section 468(2)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure has made a provision that no Court shall take cognisance of an offence which is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding three years, after the lapse of three years. The offence under section 406, Indian Penal Code, falls under this category this being so, the period of limitation would be three years from the date of the offence, as postulated under section 489, Code of Criminal Procedure. As already noticed, the parties had lived together for many sears and had three children, all of whom are said to be residing with their father. The complaint was filed after a lapse of 73 years of the marriage. The learned counsel for the respondent has indeed tried to wriggle out of the bar of limitation by contending that in the complaint, it is alleged that the return of the articles of dowry was demanded about seven or eight days before the filing of the complaint. This contention cannot, however, prevail for two reasons. Firstly, in the last para of the complaint itself, it is mentioned that a demand for the return of the articles had been made "so many times" earlier. There being no allegation as to when the demand was made and not complied with for the first time, the date of the commission of the alleged offence under section 406, Indian Penal Code, cannot be ascertained Secondly, even the allegation that the last demand was made seven or eight days before the filing of the complaint, was never substantiated in the preliminary evidence produced by the complainant. Neither she nor any of her witnesses made any such allegation in their depositions. This fact is not controverted by the learned counsel for the respondent. Furthermore, it is the allegation of the respondent herself that she had been turned out of the house by the petitioners more than three years before the filing of the complaint. The result is that the complaint, in so for as the offence under section 406, Indian Penal Code, is barred by limitation.