BALJIT SINGH AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Through this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioners impugn Annexure P.5, order of the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Amritsar, dated May 29, 1979, declaring their cessation as Members of the Board of Directors of Taran Tarn Central Co- operative Bank Ltd. This order is based on Rule 26 of the Punjab Co-operative Societies Rules, 1963 read with bye-law 34(2) of the Tarn Taran Central Co- operative Bank Ltd. Rule 26 lays down that a Member of the Committee--Board of Directors in this case--shall cease to hold office as such if he continues to be in default in respect of any sum due from him to the Co-operative Society for such period as may be laid down in the bye-laws. Bye-laws 34(2) in turn provides that a member of the Board of Directors shall cease to hold office if he is a representative of a Society which is defaulter in respect of a loan of the Bank continuously for a period of three months. As the Deputy Registrar was of the view that the petitioners were the representatives of the societies who were the members of the Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. Tarn Taran and the said Societies had remained defaulters for the refund of the loan advanced to them by the Bank, the petitioners being the representatives of the said societies on the Board of Directors ceased to be the Directors after three months' continuous default of their Societies.

(2.) The impugned order is assailed by Mr. B.S.Khoji, learned counsel for the petitioners on the primary ground that the same is entirely without jurisdiction and the Deputy Registrar had no right or authority to pass the said order. For this submission he relied on two earlier Division Bench judgments of this Court as Lakha Singh v. The Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Punjab, Chandigarh, 1973 AIR(P&H) 13 and Sewa Singh v. The State of Punjab, 1973 P.L.J. 744. This is what has been held in the latter judgment on the basis of the earlier pronouncement.

(3.) The case of the respondents is that as per Notification No. 1669-C.V.- 78/6450, dated March 21, 1978, (Annexure R.2) all powers of the Registrar exercisable under the aforesaid Act (Punjab Co-operative Societies Act) and Rules framed thereunder, except the powers exercisable under section 26(1-D) and section 27 in respect of Co-operative Sugar Mills, Co-operative Consumer Store and Central Co-operative Banks had been conferred on the Deputy Registrar, the latter was competent to pass the impugned order. It may be mentioned here that this notification Annexure R.2, supersedes the earlier similar notification which was under consideration in the above-noted two Division Bench judgments cited on the side of the petitioners. The learned counsel for the parties are agreed that the phraseology of the two notifications that is, Annexure R.2 and the notification which was under consideration in those judgments, being exactly similar, so far as the conferment of powers on the Deputy Registrar is concerned, the reference to the present notification. Annexure R/2 wouldn't make any difference so far as the applicability of the ratio of the reported judgments is concerned. However, Mr. G.S. Gandhi, learned counsel for the respondents point out that as the powers of cessation are not conferred by section 26(1-D) or section 27 of the Act, which powers alone have been excepted or excluded in respect of Co-operative Sugar Mills, Co-operative Consumers Stores and Central Co- operative Banks, from being delegated to the Deputy Registrar all the remaining powers of the Registrar under the Act and the Rules have duly been conferred on the Deputy Registrar and thus the Deputy Registrar in this case could exercise the powers of the Registrar and the order of cessation of the petitioners. In short the submission is that as has been held in the Division Bench judgments, the Registrar under the Act was competent to pass the order of cessation and this powers has not been excluded while conferring the powers of the Registrar on the Deputy Registrar vide Annexure R.2, the latter was fully competent to pass the impugned order. This submission of the learned counsel would have deserved some consideration had I not been bound to follow the above-noted two Division Bench judgments of this Court. In the light of these pronouncements, I have no hesitation in holding that the impugned order, Annexure P.5 is apparently without jurisdiction and has to be quashed.