(1.) THE only and the all important question which requires adjudication in these appeals is whether an agreement arrived at between a group of persons and the Chief Minister of a State can be enforced by issuance of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
(2.) SHORTLY stated, the facts necessary for deciding the above mentioned question are that in the year 1982 the Government of Punjab acquired land falling in different districts including District Ropar for construction of SYL Canal Project (Punjab ). The land belonging to the appellants is covered by that acquisition. After the passing of award by the Land Acquisition Collector, the possession of the land was taken by the respondents. The appellants filed reference applications Under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, 'the Act' ). While deciding such applications, the District Judge, Ropar enhanced the amount of compensation. Feeling dis-satisfied with the enhancement ordered by the District Judge, the appellants or atleast some of them filed Regular First Appeals, which were pending on the date of the filing of the writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution.
(3.) SHRI R. L. Sharma and Shri Rajesh Garg argued that the order of the learned Single Judge is erroneous in law because various points urged on behalf of the appellants have not been dealt with and also because the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate the appellants case that a valuable right came to vest in them by virtue of the settlement dated 27. 4. 1986 arrived at between the Chief Minister of the State and the members of the SYL Action Committee. They argued that the settlement which was signed by the Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister, representing the Government of Punjab must be treated as an agreement within the meaning of Section 11 (2) of 'the Act' and the same can be enforced by issuance of an appropriate writ. Shri Sharma further submitted that the settlement dated 27. 4. 1986 has already been acted upon by the Land Acquisition Collector while passing awards in favour of other land owners and there does not exist any reason why similar benefits should not be given to the appellants. Shri Sharma submitted that a welfare state cannot discriminate between similarly situated persons while awarding compensation in land acquisition proceedings. He relied on the following decisions: (1) The Union of India and Ors. v. M/s Anglo Afghan Agencies etc. , AIR 1968 SC718. (2) Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh,2 AIR 1985 SC 1576. (3) Ram Mehar v. Union of India, AIR 1987 Delhi 130. Shri Sharma further argued that giving of award under the Act is an administrative Act and, therefore, the Land Acquisition Collector could review/revise the award given in favour of the appellants. According to the learned counsel the failure of the Land Acquisition Collector to revise the awards passed in the cases of the appellants is also discriminatory because in the cases of similarly situated-other land owners, the awards were revised and higher compensation was granted. Learned Advocate General controverted the arguments of Shri Sharma and Shri Garg and submitted that the appellants cannot seek enforcement of the so-called settlement/agreement because the same can neither be treated an order passed by the Governor nor can it be treated as an agreement for the purpose of Section 11 (2) of the Act. Shri Grewal pointed out that the possession of the land belonging to the appellants had been taken prior to the signing of the so-called settlement. He submitted that the appellants cannot derive any benefit from the so-called settlement because the government had not taken any decision to give effect to the same. Learned Advocate General also opposed the appellants' plea regarding discrimination and urged that they are not entitled to claim parity with other land owners qua whom the awards had not been announced till 27. 4. 1986. In the last, Shri Grewal argued that the writ jurisdiction should not be exercised in favour of the appellants because the appeals filed by them for enhancement of the compensation are pending before this Court.