- (1.)The petitioner was enrolled as a Constable on December 5, 1998. He was chargesheeted for absence from duty. Having been found to be guilty, the Superintendent of Police ordered that he be dismissed. On December 5, 1995, he was dismissed from service. A copy of this order is on record as Annexure P/2. The petitioner filed an appeal which was dismissed vide order dated February 2, 1996. A copy of this order is on record as Annexure P/4. The petitioner's revision petition was also rejected vide order dated April 20, 1997. Copy of the order is on record as Annexure P/5. The petitioner has approached this Court with the prayer that the impugned orders, copies of which have been produced as Annexures P/2, P/4 and P/5, be quashed and that he be reinstated with all consequential benefits.
(2.)We have heard Mr. Malik, learned counsel for the petitioner. The learned counsel submits that the impugned orders deserve to be quashed as the respondents have taken into consideration the petitioner's past record of service without giving him any opportunity to explain his position in respect thereof. Learned counsel has also submitted that the orders are violative of the provisions of Rule 16.2 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 inasmuch as the fact that the petitioner has served the department for seven years has not been taken into consideration. Learned counsel has also contended that absence from duty for 59 days is not such a grave misconduct as to warrant the extreme penalty of dismissal from service. He has relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in State of Punjab v. Parkash Chand, 1992 1 SCT 123.
(3.)Admittedly the petitioner had remained absent from duty from April 8, 1995 to June 8, 1995. The disciplinary authority had found that the petitioner being a member of a disciplined force, the act of absence from duty was "of the gravest kind." It was further found that there was "no mitigating circumstances whatsoever on record in favour of the defaulter". Resultantly, it was considered that he should not be retained in service and he was ordered to be dismissed. The petitioner filed an appeal. He claimed that the punishment was highly disproportionate to the charge and a lenient view ought to have been taken. He also averred that in view of the provisions of Rule 16.2 the punishment of "dismissal" can be awarded only for continued acts of misconduct. The petitioner's absence was not enough to warrant the extreme penalty of dismissal. While dealing with these contentions, the appellate authority found that the appellant's plea for mercy could not be accepted in view of his past record of service. It was noticed that after his recruitment on December 5, 1988, six adverse entries had been recorded against the petitioner. He had been awarded the penalty of censure, stoppage of two future crements and warning. Thereafter an order for stoppage of two future increments was again passed in the year 1995. Yet again, in the year 1995 itself, another penalty to stoppage of three increments was awarded to the petitioner. It was also noticed that most of these "punishments were awarded for absence". In view of this factual position the appellate authority concluded that the appellant "has proved himself to be incorrigible and deserves no leniency". Surely, the intention was not to punish the petitioner for his past misconduct but it was only to indicate that the continued acts of misconduct showed that he was incorrigible and that no case for taking a lenient view was made out. In view of this factual position, it cannot be said that the petitioner was awarded the penalty of dismissal on account of his past record of service. In fact, it was only taken into consideration to consider his plea regarding Rule 16.2.