TIKKA NAVDEEP SINGH Vs. UNION TERRITORY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) CHALLENGE herein is to an order, Annexure P-1 dated June 25, 1979 passed by the Assistant Estate Officer exercising the powers of the Estate Officer as also to the order passed by the Chief Administrator, dated September 8, 1981, Annexure P-2 vide which the appeal preferred by the petitioner against order, Annexure P-l, was dismissed. Challenge is also to an order dated June 26, 1991, Annexure P-3, passed by the Advisor to Administrator the same fate.

(2.) THERE is no need at all to give the detailed facts of the case and suffice it to say that the impugned order, Annexure P- l, was passed as the petitioner had put the residential house to use as a guest house. For misuser of the building, therefore, a show cause notice was issued and after finding that petitioner had put the residential house to the use of a guest house, site in question, i. e. House No. 346, Sector 21, Chandigarh, was resumed.

(3.) THE learned Counsel representing the respondents, however, contends that Supreme Court while dealing with the case of Babu Singh Bains v. Union of India and Ors. (supra) had only commented upon the provisions of Haryana Develop ment Authority Act whereas in the present case action had been taken tinder the provisions of Capital of Punjab (Development & Regulation) Act, 1952. The judgment of the Apex Court in Babu Singh Bains v. Union of India and Ors. is, thus, not applicable to the facts of the case contends the learned Counsel representing the respondents. Mr. Patwalia, learned Counsel representing the petitioner with a view to controvert the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents contends that even if it is true that in Babu Singh Bains v. Union of India and Ors. (supra) the Apex Court was dealing with the provisions, of Haryana Development, Authority Act yet while the matter was decided by this Court provision of Capital of Punjab (Development & Regulation) Act, 1952 were compared and held part materia. It is further the contention of the learned Counsel that no distinction at all was made by the Supreme Court on the basis of provisions of the two Acts referred to above and in every case, if the misuser was to stop the site or building as the case may be was restored and only penalty was imposed. This contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner could not be controverted by the learned Counsel repre-senting the respondents. This court is also of the view that no distinction at all on the basis of the provisions of the two Acts referred to above can possibly be made nor any such distinction was made by the Supreme Court in Babu Singh Bains v. Union of India and Ors. (supra ). A reading of the judgment passed by this Court against which an appeal was carried culminating in a decision rendered in Babu Singh Bains's case (supra) would also show that provisions of the two Acts were compared and held pari materia. There is no need to go into the question whether misuser has been stopped or not. Suffice it to say that respondent-authorities will verify as to whether misuser has stopped and in case it has, orders of resumption shall not be invoked against the petitioner. However, if the misuser is still there and if the petitioner again puts the premises to some other use, a fresh order of resumption shall be passed without taking recourse to any proceedings.