GIRDHARI LAL Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BY filing this petition under Section 482 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. and Article 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioner-accused has sought quashment of complaint Annexure P-2 and the charge Annexure P-3 filed/framed against him under Section 16(i)(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (as amended by amending Act of 1976) (in short, the Act).

(2.) IT is apposite at the threshold to give in a nutshell the facts of the complaint Annexure P-2 filed against the petitioner in the lower court. The complianant is duly authorised Food Inspector, who inspected the petitioner's shop on October 15, 1992 at 12.10 p.m. and took a sa.m.ple of mustard oil sarson oil) for analysis, which was duly divided into three parts and was filled in three empty and dried bottles which were duly sealed as per provisions of the Act. One such sample was sent to the Public Analyst for analysis, who gave his report Annexure P-1 and opined that the contents of the sample are hazy and in the form of emulsion, whereas sarson oil should be clear and thus gave an opinion that it was adulterated. On the basis of this report complaint Annexure P-2 was filed against the petitioner. The learned lower court fra.m.ed charge for the said offence against the petitioner on July 15, 1995.

(3.) LEARNED A.A.G. Punjab contended that the complainant was duly authorised by the Government to prosecute the petitioner under Section 20 of the Act. Hence the first assailment is devoid of any substance. So far as the second contention is concerned, he contented that the Public Analyst in his report has clearly mentioned that the contents of the sample are hazy and in the form of emulsion, whereas sarson oil should be clear. Hence he opined that the contents of the sample are adulterated. Learned A.A.G. clarified that Public Analyst Dr. Hargobind Singh is cited as a witness in the complaint. When he will be examined, he will explain how he has arrived at the opinion that the sample was adulterated. Lastly, he contended that time and again the apex Court has held that this power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be very sparingly and consciously used. It should be used only in rarest of rare cases where the Court comes to the conclusion that there would be manifest injustice or there would be abuse of the process of the Court if such power is not exercised. Unless the Court arrives at that conclusion the High Court should not scuttle the prosecution at its inception. In support of this contention, he has relied on Mrs Rupan Deol Bajaj and another v. K.P.S. Gill and another, JT 1995(7) SC 299.