S.C.MALTE, J. - (1.) THE quashing of the proceedings under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1948 and Section 468 I.P.C. is sought by the petitioner. The first point raised before me pertained to the inordinate delay in filing the challan. The incident pertains to May 1985. The F.I.R. was registered on 22.5.1985. This challan, however, was filed on 5.1.1996. Undoubtedly, there is an inordinate delay. The trial Court therefore, would be required to go into the aspect of inordinate delay as one of the aspects while framing the charge under Section 240 Cr.P.C.
(2.) THE second ground raised before me pertained to the age factor of the petitioner. It was further submitted that the petitioner was allowed to retire in 1994. It was further stated that the petitioner himself on 18.5.1985 had sent a letter to the Head Examiner and kept him posted with the information that there appears to be some tempering with the answer sheets because some sheets in the answer -books were found to have been written in different ink and handwriting. It was submitted that since the petitioner himself had made such a grievance, it does not stand to reason that he would indulge into the activity of obtaining money from the students in order to temper with the answer -sheets for the purpose of benefits of the students.
(3.) ALL these points can be raised before the trial Court. Since the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1948, are applied and since a warrant procedure in a case instituted on police re rt, as per part A of Chapter XIX of the Code of Criminal Procedure wo id apply, the Special Court would be under obligation to take into consideration the provisions of Sections 239 and 240 Cr.P.C. and the trial Court would be required to afford opportunity to the accused to be heard before he could form opinion for the purpose of framing of charge. The Counsel for the petitioner cited before me 1990 (3) RCR 350 (State of A.P. v. P. V. Paritharan). In that case their Lordships have quashed the F.I.R. on the ground of delay in F.I.R. In this case the F.I.R. has culminated into filing of the charge -sheet, and the trial Court is seized of the matter. Therefore, it would be in the fitness of circumstances to let the trial Court take into consideration these points while framing of charge, as mentioned above. On the basis of a case of Des Raj v. State of Punjab 1986(1) PLR 82, it was submitted that the age and the fact of the retirement, coupled with delay in prosecution was held to be sufficient ground for quashing the proceedings. Since the law point in that respect has already been settled by that ruling, there is no question of again settling that point, as I have no good reason to disagree with the said ruling. All the same, since the law point is settled that can be placed before the trial Court for his appreciation and application to the facts of the case. The petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. need not be entertained for that reason. Delay is considered to be a good ground for quashing the F.I.R. and resultant proceedings, as held in case of Amarjeet v. State of Punjab 1889 (2) RCR 193 and in a case of Sardar Singh v. U. T. 1990(2) RCR 453. All these legal position can be placed before the trial Court for the purpose of it's appreciation and application while considering framing of charge. Under these circumstances there is no warrant for exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in respect of the aspect which can be sorted out in the trial Court by placing before him the very legal and factual position which is now sought to be placed before me. This petition, therefore, is dismissed. Petition dismissed.;