PRITAM SINGH Vs. MEHAL SINGH AND ORS.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE Petitioner along with Respondent Nos. 3 to 9 were tenants on the land in dispute under Respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Ejectment order was passed against them by the prescribed authority and the same was confirmed by the Commissioner on 24th June, 1978. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 thereafter filed the present suit for mesne profits alleging that the Petitioner and Respondents Nos. 3 to 9 were in wrongful possession of the land in dispute since the order of ejectment was confirmed by the Commissioner. When the case was fixed for their evidence, the Defendants moved an application that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the present suit and the same was only triable by a Revenue Court by virtue of the provisions of Sections 14 and 77 of the Punjab Tenancy Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Their objection having been over -ruled, one of the Defendants has come up in this revision.

(2.) IN the first instance, the case came up for hearing before my learned Brother G.C. Mital, J., who referred it to a larger Bench in view of two conflicting Single Bench decisions of this Court in Faqir Singh v. Gurbachan Singh and Ors., 1971 P.L.R. 923 and Gordhan Dass v. Sanjha Ram, 1969 P.L.R. 120. This is how we are seized of this matter.

(3.) FROM a bare reading of the provisions of Section 77(3) and Clause (n) of Third Groups it is apparent that if a suit is covered by the provisions of Section 14, it can be instituted only in. the Revenue Court and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is expressly barred. Though in Section 14. the word used is 'landlord', but in the context in which it has been used, it has to be given the same meaning as that of a land -owner. The word 'landlord' according to Section 4, Sub -section (6) of the Act, means a person under whom a tenant holds land and to whom the tenant is, or but for a special contract, liable to pay rent for that land. Section 14 deals with any person in possession of land who has occupied the same without the consent of the landlord. Such a person obviously cannot be a tenant. So, the owner of the land cannot be the landlord qua that persons as defined in Section 4, Sub -section (6) of the Act and the word 'land. lord' in Section 14 has to be understood only signifying the person who owns the land and not the landlord as defined in Section 4. A suit by a owner for mesne profits against a person who is in possession against his consent, therefore, would be covered by Section 14 of the Act and only triable by the Revenue Court. P.C. Pandit, J. in Faqir Singhs case (supra) held that suit for mesne profits against a trespasser would not be covered by provisions of Section 14 on the ground that neither the Plaintiff would be a landlord as defined in the Act nor the Defendant a tenant. As discussed above, the word 'landlord' in Section 14 has to be understood to signify the term 'land -owner' and not the term 'landlord' and defined in Section 4 of the Act. A Division Bench of the Pepsu High Court in Inder Singh v. Lal Singh and Anr. , I.L.R. 1955 115 and later on Mehar Singh, C.J. in Gordhan Dass's case (supra) also took the view that a suit by a land -owner against a person in wrongful possession of the land would be cognizable only by the Revenue Court, though on different reasons. We are, therefore, of the considered view that Faqir Singh's case (supra) was not correctly decided and overrule. the same.