(1.) THIS Bench has been constituted to decide whether the mode of determining compensation prescribed by the amendment in the provisions of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Acquisition Act), by Section 59 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act (hereinafter referred to as the Improvement Act), results in discrimination where the land of a citizen is acquired for the purposes of the Improvement Act. Another point for consideration is whether the non-provision of a right of appeal against the award of the Tribunal under the Improvement Act amounts to discrimination because under the Acquisition Act right of appeal has been provided against the award of the District Judge to the High Court. Reference to the Full Bench has been made by order dated January 7, 1971, passed by a Division Bench consisting of D. K. Mahajan and Gopal Singh, JJ. Previously, eight of these writ petitions came up for hearing before Suri, J. , and he was informed that C. W. No. 2391 of 1970, in which the questions involved were the same as in the writ petitions before him, had been admitted direct to a Division Bench and was on the daily list of the III Division Bench. The learned Judge directed that the eight writ petitions before him should also be placed before that Bench. Thus nine writ petitions (Nos. 3276 of 1969, 2319, 2474, 2523, 2609, 2611, 2612, 2629 and 3013 of 1970) came up for hearing before the Bench consisting of D. K. Mahajan and Gopal Singh, JJ. L. P. A. Nos. 771 of 1970 and 30 and 33 of 1971 were also directed to be heard with this reference by the Division Bench hearing those appeals.
(2.) THE land for a Town Improvement Trust is acquired under the Acquisition Act and Section 59 of the Improvement Act has made certain modifications in the provisions of the Acquisition Act. These modifications are contained in the Schedule to the Improvement Act, para 10 of which mentions the amendments made to Section 23 of the Acquisition Act and reads as under:-"
(3.) SARWAN Singh's case (supra), however, also decided that the denial of the right of appeal available in the case of acquisition under the Acquisition Act does not make Section 59 of the Improvement Act ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. In view of that judgment, the attack on the vires of Section 59 of the Improvement Act on that ground is no more available to the petitioners.